

bullets by immunisation.⁴⁷¹ However, some initiates, such as members of the War Council, chose only to be immunised and not to fight in the battles.⁴⁷²

316. Kondewa was in charge of the initiations at Base Zero; however, it was Norman who decided who should be initiated or who could join the Kamajors.⁴⁷³ The initiation fee was about 10,000 leones and was paid directly to Kondewa.⁴⁷⁴

317. An example of a Base Zero initiation of fighters was one that involved a group of 400 candidates who were gathered naked in the bush while singing. Children as young as eleven or twelve years of age were in this group, but the majority were adults. Marks were made on initiates' bodies with razor blades and they were told not to bathe for one week. The blade marks symbolised the completion of the initiation. After one week, the initiates were gathered at a graveyard in the middle of the night and allowed to bathe. The initiates were told that if anyone had died for them, that person would return to them in the graveyard and give them something to make them powerful fighters. A substance called "tevi", a mixture of burnt human ashes with herbs and leaves in palm oil, was given to all initiates to rub on their bodies before going to the warfront.⁴⁷⁵

2.2.9. Training

318. Training was an important component of the operations at Base Zero. When Norman first landed in Talia, he told the crowd that President Kabbah had sent him there to set up a training base so that they could fight the war and bring peace to the country.⁴⁷⁶ Any initiate wanting to become a combatant had to go through military training.⁴⁷⁷ MS Dumbuya, who was once the head of the armed wing of the Sierra Leone Police known as the State Security Division ("SSD"), led the

⁴⁷¹ Transcript of 27 January 2006, Samuel Hinga Norman, p. 95.

⁴⁷² Transcript of 17 November 2004, TF2-068, pp. 79-80 (CS).

⁴⁷³ Transcript of 8 June 2005, TF2-011 p. 17 (CS).

⁴⁷⁴ Transcript of 2 November 2004, TF2-021, p. 43.

⁴⁷⁵ Transcript of 2 November 2004, TF2-021, pp. 37-43; Transcript of 12 October 2006, Abibu Brima, pp. 60-63. For examples of killings as part of Kamajor rituals see the killings of Alpha Dauda Kanu and Mustafa Fallon in Talia and the killing of TF2-088's son in Kpetewoma, described in sections V.2.8.5 and V.2.5.7.2.1; See also Transcript of 19 November 2004, TF2-017, p. 27 (CS).

⁴⁷⁶ Transcript of 8 November 2004, TF2-096, pp. 18-19 and 54-55; see also section V.2.2.3.

⁴⁷⁷ Transcript of 8 June 2005, TF2-011, p. 44 (CS).

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training along with a man named Mbogba.⁴⁷⁸ Norman was one of the instructors.⁴⁷⁹ There were up to 5,000 trainees at Base Zero at any given time.⁴⁸⁰ After the training, a passing out parade would be held at Base Zero, which signified that the Kamajors had passed their training and could present their skills.⁴⁸¹ Thereafter each trainee would be given a certificate, which was signed by Norman, Kondewa and Mbogba.⁴⁸²

319. Different levels of training were given for different trainees. For instance, one of the members of the War Council, who was not a combatant, learned "cock and fire" techniques, which took about three to four days, and was given his certificate. A combatant, on the other hand, would be trained for up to two weeks, and learned how to assemble weapons, what to do when ambushed and how to roll like a snake when being followed by a troop. All training was done at the Talia School Field and behind it, where there was an obstacle course with ropes hanging and trenches dug.⁴⁸³

2.2.10. Planning Operations: Meetings at Base Zero

2.2.10.1. Passing out Parade in December 1997

320. Between 10 and 12 December 1997, a passing out parade was held at Base Zero. It was witnessed by many civilians and Kamajors at Talia. At this parade instructions for the Tongo and Black December operations were given.⁴⁸⁴

321. Norman said in the open that "the attack on Tongo will determine who the winner or the looser of the war would be" and that "[...] there is no place to keep captured or war prisoners like the juntas, let alone their collaborators".⁴⁸⁵ TF2-222 felt uncomfortable with this command because "[g]iving such a command to a group that was 95 percent illiterate who had been wronged,

⁴⁷⁸ Transcript of 18 February 2005, TF2-222, p. 40; Transcript of 10 February 2005, Bobor Tucker, pp. 42-43; Transcript of 16 November 2004, TF2-008, pp. 65-67; Transcript of 26 January 2006, Samuel Hinga Norman, p. 56; Transcript of 17 February 2006, MT Collier, p. 48; Transcript of 8 June 2005, TF2-011, p. 45 (CS).

⁴⁷⁹ Transcript of 16 November 2004, TF2-008, pp. 63, 66.

⁴⁸⁰ Transcript of 10 February 2005, Bobor Tucker, p. 43

⁴⁸¹ Transcript of 18 February 2005, TF2-222, p. 7.

⁴⁸² Transcript of 10 February 2005, Bobor Tucker, p. 43; Transcript of 16 November 2004, TF2-008, p. 67; Exhibit 26; Transcript of 19 November 2004, TF2-008, p. 67.

⁴⁸³ Transcript of 15 February 2005, p. 89 (CS).

⁴⁸⁴ Transcript of 17 February 2005, TF2-222, pp. 104-111.

⁴⁸⁵ Transcript of 17 February 2005, TF2-222, p. 110; See also Transcript of 7 February 2006, Samuel Hinga Norman, pp. 41-44; Transcript of 15 February 2005, TF2-005, p. 106 (CS).

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is like telling them an eye for an eye” and meant telling them not to “[...] spare the vulnerables [sic]”.⁴⁸⁶ Norman also said that “[if] the international community is condemning human rights abuses [...] then I take care of the human left abuses”, which was clarified by him to mean that “[...] any junta you capture, instead of wasting your bullet, chop off his left [hand] as an indelible mark [...] to be a signal to any group that will want to seize power through the barrels of the gun and not the ballot paper [;] [w]e are in Africa, we want to practice democracy”.⁴⁸⁷ He also told the fighters to “spare the houses of those men who burnt down your own houses”, which TF2-222 took to be very ironical. He understood the last instruction as telling the fighters indirectly not to spare house of the juntas.⁴⁸⁸ Fofana also spoke at this meeting saying “[n]ow, you’ve heard the National Coordinator [...] any commander failing to perform accordingly and losing your own ground, just decide to kill yourself there and don’t come to report to us.”⁴⁸⁹ Then all the fighters looked at Kondewa, admiring him as a man with mystic power, and he gave the last comment saying “a rebel is a rebel; surrendered, not surrendered, they’re all rebels [... t]he time for their surrender had long since been exhausted, so we don’t need any surrendered rebel.” He then said, “I give you my blessings; go my boys, go.”⁴⁹⁰

2.2.10.2. Commanders’ Meeting in December 1997 for Tongo

322. Following the passing out parade, a meeting was held by Norman at the *walehun*,⁴⁹¹ which was a small place in the bush which took the role of a big *barri*.⁴⁹² Further instructions for the Tongo and Black December operations were then given to the commanders by Norman.⁴⁹³ The meeting had in attendance, among others, Fofana, Kondewa, Mohamed Orinco Moosa, Albert J Nallo, KG Samai, Ngobeh, some commanders from the Tongo area, such as, Musa Junisa, TF2-

⁴⁸⁶ Transcript of 17 February 2005, TF2-222, p. 111.

⁴⁸⁷ Transcript of 17 February 2005, TF2-222, pp. 112-114.

⁴⁸⁸ Transcript of 17 February 2005, TF2-222, pp. 114-115; TF2-222 also testified that later that day, Alhaji Daramy Rogers held a meeting with TF2-222, Hashim Kallon, George Jambawai and Paramount Chief Charles Caulker to discuss Norman’s orders. They were all in agreement that the CDF was now taking the same line of operation as the juntas and doing “unholy acts”. Transcript of 17 February 2005, pp. 116-118.

⁴⁸⁹ Transcript of 17 February 2005, TF2-222, p. 119.

⁴⁹⁰ Transcript of 17 February 2005, TF2-222, pp. 119-120.

⁴⁹¹ Transcript of 26 May 2005, TF2-079, pp. 55-56.

⁴⁹² Transcript of 17 February 2005, TF2-222, p. 102.

⁴⁹³ Transcript of 15 February 2005, TF2-005, pp. 105-107 (CS); Transcript of 26 May 2005, TF2-079, p. 55.

079 and Vandi Songo, and some members of the War Council.⁴⁹⁴ Norman repeated that whoever took Tongo would win the war and that it should be taken at all costs. He told them not to spare anyone working with the juntas or mining for them.⁴⁹⁵ Norman also said that all collaborators should forfeit their properties and be killed. Norman ordered that gravels mined by the AFRC/RUF should be washed by the Kamajors and the proceeds should be taken to Base Zero.⁴⁹⁶ Everyone in the meeting contributed to the discussion, including Fofana and Kondewa. Norman then ordered Fofana to provide logistics for the operation.⁴⁹⁷ At the meeting, Norman suggested that a deputy should be elected to deputise Fofana. Oranco Moosa was elected to this position.⁴⁹⁸

2.2.10.3. Passing out Parade in Early January 1998 / "All-out Offensive"

323. One afternoon in early January 1998 the bell rang to say that Norman wanted to see all Kamajors at the training field urgently.⁴⁹⁹ The meeting was to plan an "all-out offensive" in all of the areas occupied by the juntas.⁵⁰⁰ The War Council members were there, the two Accused, the battalion commanders, the Kamajors who had been trained, and children who were involved in the operations.⁵⁰¹ Norman thanked the Kamajors for the training they had undergone and talked about the operations that had been undertaken and those that were pending and their importance. Norman said that he had given instructions for the pending operations and that the Kamajors should follow those instructions.⁵⁰² Norman also said that "whoever knows that he is used to fighting with the cutlass, it is time for him to take up the cutlass; w]hoever knows that he's

⁴⁹⁴ Transcript of 26 May 2005, TF2-079, p. 53; Transcript of 15 February 2005, TF2-005, pp. 105-106 (CS); See also Transcript of 4 November 2004, pp. 103-105 (CS).

⁴⁹⁵ Transcript of 15 February 2005, TF2-005, p. 106 (CS); Transcript of 4 November 2004, TF2-201, pp. 107-108 (CS); Transcript of 5 November 2004, TF2-201, p. 82 (CS); TF2-201 testified that immediately after the Kamajors left for Tongo, Norman went on the BBC radio telling civilians to leave Tongo because there would be an attack and if they did not leave, they would be categorised as a rebel. See also Transcript of 26 May 2005, TF2-079, pp. 63-66; Transcript of 7 February 2006, Samuel Hinga Norman, pp. 41-44.

⁴⁹⁶ Transcript of 26 May 2005, TF2-079, p. 55.

⁴⁹⁷ Transcript of 15 February 2005, TF2-005, pp. 106-107 (CS).

⁴⁹⁸ Transcript of 26 May 2005, TF2-079, p. 40.

⁴⁹⁹ Transcript of 19 November 2004, TF2-017, p. 87 (CS).

⁵⁰⁰ Transcript of 10 February 2005, Bobor Tucker, p. 45.

⁵⁰¹ Transcript of 10 February 2005, Bobor Tucker, pp. 45 and 83-84; Transcript of 19 November 2004, TF2-017, pp. 87-91 (CS).

⁵⁰² Transcript of 10 February 2005, Bobor Tucker, pp. 45-46; Transcript of 19 November 2004, TF2-017, pp. 88-89 (CS).

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used to fighting with a gun, it is time for him to take up the gun; w]hoever knows that he's used to fight with a stick, it is time to him to take up his stick."⁵⁰³

324. Fofana also spoke at this meeting saying:

[T]he advice that Pa Norman had given to us, that the training that we underwent for a long time, the time has come for us to implement what we've learned. Now that we have received the order that we shall attack the various areas where the juntas are located, they have done a lot for the trainees. They've spent a lot on them. So any commander, if you are given an area to launch an attack and you fail to accomplish that mission, do not return to Base Zero.⁵⁰⁴

325. During his speech, Fofana told the fighters to attack the villages where the juntas were located and "to destroy the soldiers finally from where they were [...] settled".⁵⁰⁵ Fofana also said that the failure to take Koribondo was "a disgrace to the Kamajors that [sic] were [sic] close to Base Zero because [...] medicine that is given to Kamajors comes from there [and] [t]hat's where they come from to attack Koribondo [sic] many [times]." He then said that "[...] this time around, he wants them to go and capture Koribondo."⁵⁰⁶

326. Kondewa said "I am going to give you my blessings [...] and] the medicines, which would make you to be fearless if you didn't spoil the law."⁵⁰⁷ Kondewa said that all of his powers had been transferred to them to protect them, so that no cutlass would strike them and that they should not be afraid.⁵⁰⁸

327. Afterwards, Norman said that a commanders' meeting was yet to be held where he would reveal which operations were going to be undertaken.⁵⁰⁹

2.2.10.4. Commanders' Meeting for Koribondo in Early January 1998

328. A subsequent meeting was held by Norman in the *walehun*, where the War Council members, the two Accused and some commanders were present.⁵¹⁰ Norman asked Lamin Ngobeh,

⁵⁰³ Transcript of 10 February 2005, Bobor Tucker, pp. 45, line 29 and p. 46 line 5.

⁵⁰⁴ Transcript of 10 February 2005, Bobor Tucker, p. 45, lines 13-21.

⁵⁰⁵ Transcript of 10 February 2005, Bobor Tucker, pp. 82-84.


⁵⁰⁶ Transcript of 4 November 2004, TF2-201, p. 113, lines 11-16 (CS).

⁵⁰⁷ Transcript of 4 November 2004, TF2-201, p. 113, lines 16-19 (CS).

⁵⁰⁸ Transcript of 10 February 2005, Bobor Tucker, p. 46.

⁵⁰⁹ Transcript of 19 November 2004, TF2-017, p. 89 (CS).

⁵¹⁰ Transcript of 16 November 2004, TF2-008, pp. 78-80; see also Transcript of 8 June 2005, TF2-011, pp. 28-29 (CS).





then the National Director of Operations, to call Joe Tamidey, the commander for Koribondo.⁵¹¹ Joe Tamidey was chosen by Norman to lead the attack on Koribondo.⁵¹²

329. Norman said that they should take Koribondo "at all costs" because they had already spent a lot on Koribondo.⁵¹³ He said that Koribondo had been attacked three or four times before without the CDF taking it.⁵¹⁴ He told the commanders that when they got to Koribondo not to "leave any house or any living thing there, except mosque, church, the *barri* and the school."⁵¹⁵ He specified that this time they should destroy or burn everything in the town and that anyone left in Koribondo should be termed an enemy or a rebel and killed since they had been forewarned of such consequences.⁵¹⁶

330. Joe Tamidey then requested ammunition, food and money, which was approved.⁵¹⁷ Joe Tamidey got his ammunitions at Base Zero from Lumeh at the order of Norman. Bobor Tucker had reserve ammunitions from before that he used.⁵¹⁸

331. At this meeting Bobor Tucker's group was specifically ordered to reinforce the Bo-Koribondo Highway so that no one could come from Bo to help the juntas.⁵¹⁹

2.2.10.5. Commanders' Meeting for Bo in Early January 1998

332. In the evening of the same day of passing out parade, a second commanders' meeting was held by Norman at the back of the field. The two Accused, the War Council, and commanders attended. Norman addressed the group and told the Kamajors that they had an assignment to attack Bo Town. They were told to kill enemy combatants and people who had connections with or supported the rebels and who were therefore worse than the combatants. He referred to them as "collaborators". The Kamajors were also told to burn down houses and loot big shops, especially

⁵¹¹ Transcript of 4 November 2004, TF2-201, p. 113 (CS); see also Transcript of 8 June 2005, TF2-011, pp. 28-29 (CS).

⁵¹² Transcript of 8 June 2005, TF2-011, pp. 28-29 (CS).

⁵¹³ Transcript of 4 November 2004, TF2-201, p. 113 (CS).

⁵¹⁴ Transcript of 8 June 2005, TF2-011, p. 30 (CS).

⁵¹⁵ Transcript of 16 November 2004, TF2-008, p. 79.

⁵¹⁶ Transcript of 8 June 2005, TF2-011, pp. 30-31 (CS); Transcript of 15 September 2004, pp. 10 and 35 (CS); Transcript of 2 November 2004, TF2-021, p. 62.

⁵¹⁷ Transcript of 4 November 2004, TF2-201, p. 114 (CS).

⁵¹⁸ Transcript of 10 February 2005, Bobor Tucker, pp. 47-48.

⁵¹⁹ Transcript of 10 February 2005, Bobor Tucker, p. 47.

pharmacies, in the areas that were rebel-held.⁵²⁰ Norman added that the adult fighters were doing less than the children, and were just eating and looting.⁵²¹

333. Norman called TF2-017 and said he was a good fighter. He then called other commanders, James Kaillie, Battalion commander from Bumpeh, and Joseph Lappia, deputy battalion commander from Bumpeh. They were told to go on a test case for Bo and to attack Kebi town where the rebel brigade headquarters was located. Norman told them to get ammunitions for the attack directly after the meeting. He told them where they were to meet him after the attack and to bring something back to prove that they had attacked. Norman also said that if they repelled the rebels, they would take the country for three years. Fofana provided the commanders with arms, ammunitions and a vehicle.⁵²²

2.2.10.6. Meeting with Nallo in Early February 1998 / Specific Instructions for Bo and Koribondo

334. Albert J Nallo did all the planning for the Koribondo attack and then submitted it to the Director of War, Fofana, who then submitted it to Norman. Norman called Nallo before the Koribondo and Bo attacks and gave him specific instructions for these two attacks. Fofana was present.⁵²³

335. Norman told Nallo that the Kamajors had tried to capture Koribondo many times and that they had failed because the civilians had given their children to the juntas in marriage and thus, they were all "spies and collaborators". Therefore, when he goes to Koribondo "anybody that was met there should be killed" and nothing should be left "not even a farm" or "[...] a fowl". All houses were to be burnt, and he was given petrol for the job. Some specific names were mentioned: Shekou Gbao, the driver, should be killed and his compound burnt because he was giving his vehicle to the juntas. The house of Mike Lamin's father was also to be burnt because Mike Lamin was RUF. Mr Biyo, a driver, should also have his compound burnt.⁵²⁴ Although Joe

⁵²⁰ Transcript of 19 November 2004, TF2-017, pp. 92-95 (CS); See also: Transcript of 11 May 2006, Joe Nunie, pp. 92-93. Joe Nunie testified that the plan to capture Bo was made at Base Zero.

⁵²¹ Transcript of 19 November 2004, TF2-017, pp. 89-90 (CS).

⁵²² Transcript of 19 November 2004, TF2-017, pp. 95-97 (CS).

⁵²³ Transcript of 10 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, pp. 44 and 70-77.

⁵²⁴ Transcript of 10 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, pp. 77-79.

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Tamidey was appointed by Norman to lead the attack on Koribondo, he and the other commanders involved in that attack were under Nallo's overall command.⁵²⁵

336. Regarding Bo, Norman told Nallo that he should loot the Southern Pharmacy and bring the medicines to Norman.⁵²⁶ He also told Nallo to kill Paramount Chief Veronica Bagni of Valunia chiefdom, because she was against the Kamajor movement; JK (Kpundoh) Boima III, Paramount Chief of Bo Kakua; Madam Tuma Alias, chairlady of Bo Town Council, because she used "to collect [...] market dues"; Provincial Secretary Lansana Koroma; MB Sesay because he gave money to the juntas and prepared the *ronko* which the juntas wore so that they could not be differentiated from the Kamajors. MB Sesay should also have his house looted and burnt. Nallo was to kill Ali Fataba and burn his house because he was a collaborator who supplied fuel to the juntas. He should kill Cecil Hanciles for liaising between the juntas and the civilians. He was to kill Brima Tolli, if he saw him, and to burn his house and loot his property because the juntas ate and spent time at the house. Norman ordered Nallo to kill the police officers who used to work under the AFRC junta. Nallo carried out the orders as far as burning and looting but did not see most of the people. He would have killed them had he seen them because the law given by the National Coordinator was that if Kamajors did not follow their orders they would cut off your ear or kill you.⁵²⁷

2.2.11. Command Structure

2.2.11.1. Norman, Fofana and Kondewa - the High Command

337. Norman, Fofana and Kondewa were regarded as the "Holy Trinity".⁵²⁸ "Norman was the God, [...] Fofana was the Son, and [Kondewa] was the Holy Spirit."⁵²⁹ The three of them were the key and essential components of the leadership structure of the organisation and were the executive of the Kamajor society.⁵³⁰ They were the ones actually making the decisions⁵³¹ and

⁵²⁵ Transcript of 14 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, p. 44.

⁵²⁶ Transcript of 10 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, p. 71; Transcript of 8 June 2005, TF2-011, p. 29 (CS).

⁵²⁷ Transcript of 10 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, pp. 70-77.

⁵²⁸ Transcript of 11 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, pp. 23-24; Transcript of 8 June 2005, TF2-011, p. 31 (CS).

⁵²⁹ Transcript of 11 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, p. 24.

⁵³⁰ Transcript of 16 November 2004, TF2-008, p. 51; see also Exhibit 10 and Exhibit 11, confidential.

⁵³¹ Transcript of 8 June 2005, TF2-011, p. 31 (CS).

nobody could make a decision in their absence. Whatever happened, they would come together because they were the leaders and the Kamajors looked up to them.⁵³²

2.2.11.2. Fofana: Director of War

338. In 1995 Fofana together with Joe Tamidey and Musa Kortuwai gave instructions to the group led by Mustafa Ngobeh to fight in Baomakpengeh and Singihun. Fofana assigned Bobor Tucker specifically to lead the attack on Singihun.⁵³³ In late 1995 or early 1996 Fofana together with Jusu Kapanday, Rufus Collier, Joseph Koroma and John Swaray fought the war in Pujehun. Fofana did not then command troops. He was getting food for the fighters along with Musa and Ansu Vanjawai.⁵³⁴

339. At Base Zero Fofana was known as the "Director"⁵³⁵ or "Director of War".⁵³⁶ He was appointed to this position solely by Norman;⁵³⁷ the appointment was later confirmed by the War Council.⁵³⁸

340. The duties of the Director of War were to plan and execute the strategies for war operations. He received frontline reports, both written and verbal, from the commanders in the field and passed them to Norman.⁵³⁹ In executing these functions, Fofana was largely assisted by Albert J Nallo, the National Director of Operations, who was the only literate Director. He wrote everything for Fofana while Fofana planned in Mende.⁵⁴⁰ For example, Nallo and Fofana were the architects of the Black December Operation.⁵⁴¹ Sometimes Fofana passed on his responsibilities to

⁵³² Transcript of 16 November 2004, TF2-008, p. 51.

⁵³³ Transcript of 10 February 2005, Bobor Tucker, pp. 5-6.

⁵³⁴ Transcript of 16 September 2004, TF2-082, p. 117 (CS).

⁵³⁵ Transcript of 16 September 2004, TF2-082, pp. 120-121 (CS); Transcript of 28 September 2006, Billoh Conteh, p. 58; Transcript of 17 February 2006, MT Collier, pp. 7-8.

⁵³⁶ Transcript of 17 February 2005, TF2-222, p. 87; Exhibit 11, confidential; Transcript of 8 November 2004, TF2-096, p. 20; Transcript of 19 May 2006, Mohammed Kaineh, pp. 38-37.


⁵³⁷ Transcript of 16 February 2005, TF2-005, pp.54-55 (CS); Transcript of 17 February 2005, TF2-222, pp.96-97.

⁵³⁸ Exhibit 59.

⁵³⁹ Transcript of 26 May 2005, TF2-079, pp. 40-43; Transcript of 10 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, pp. 33-35; Transcript of 16 November 2004, TF2-008, pp. 46-47.

⁵⁴⁰ Transcript of 14 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, pp. 55-57.

⁵⁴¹ Transcript of 14 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, pp. 51-52.


Nallo.⁵⁴² The strategies for war operations, which Fofana and Nallo planned together, did not include the killing of innocent civilians, looting of property or raping of women.⁵⁴³

341. Fofana's duties as Director of War were to select commanders to go to battle and to act as the overall boss of the commanders who were at Base Zero.⁵⁴⁴ However, the final authority regarding the deployment of Kamajors belonged to Norman.⁵⁴⁵ Fofana could, on occasions, issue orders to the commanders.⁵⁴⁶ For example, he issued the order to Joe Tamidey not to release captured vehicles and other items to any other person until they were registered with CDF Headquarters.⁵⁴⁷

342. Fofana dealt with the receipt and provision of logistics for the frontline by instructing the Director of Logistics on what to make available. This included both fighting logistics, such as, arms and ammunitions, as well as social logistics, such as cigarettes, tobacco leaves and alcohol.⁵⁴⁸ However, Fofana could only give out ammunition if and when directed to do so by Norman.⁵⁴⁹ Mohamed Orinco Moosa would hand out the arms and ammunitions and Fofana would check to ensure that the right amount had been handed out to the correct commanders.⁵⁵⁰

343. Fofana was never seen on the battlefield or even with a gun and was only considered to have fought in the war because the man who feeds you is a fighter too.⁵⁵¹ Fofana was seen as having power and authority at Base Zero as he was frequently quoted on the BBC,⁵⁵² and because people did not approach him unless he summoned them.⁵⁵³

2.2.11.3. Kondewa: High Priest

⁵⁴² Transcript of 11 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, p. 59.

⁵⁴³ Transcript of 14 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, pp. 56-57.

⁵⁴⁴ Transcript of 15 February 2005, TF2-005, p. 101 (CS).

⁵⁴⁵ Transcript of 8 June 2005, TF2-011, p. 47 (CS).

⁵⁴⁶ Transcript of 16 February 2005, TF2-005, p. 17 (CS).

⁵⁴⁷ Exhibit 11, confidential; Transcript of 5 May 2005, Mustapha Lumeh, pp. 9-12.

⁵⁴⁸ Transcript of 17 February 2005, TF2-222, p. 92; Transcript of 26 May 2005, TF2-079, p. 42; Transcript of 16 November 2004, TF2-008, p. 47; Transcript of 17 February 2006, MT Collier, pp. 6-7 and 63-64.

⁵⁴⁹ Transcript of 15 February 2005, TF2-005, p. 101 (CS).

⁵⁵⁰ Transcript of 16 November 2004, TF2-008, pp. 69-70; Transcript of 4 November 2004, pp. 96-98.

⁵⁵¹ Transcript of 16 September 2004, TF2-082, p. 121 (CS).

⁵⁵² Transcript of 26 May 2005, TF2-079, pp. 42-43.

⁵⁵³ Transcript of 28 September 2006, Billoh Conteh, pp. 49-50 and 58.

344. Kondewa was known as the High Priest of the entire CDF organisation and was performing initiations at Talia.⁵⁵⁴ He was also appointed by Norman.⁵⁵⁵ He was the head of all the CDF initiators initiating the Kamajors into the Kamajor society in Sierra Leone.⁵⁵⁶ Kondewa created different types of initiations within the Kamajor movement.⁵⁵⁷

345. Kondewa's job was to prepare herbs which the Kamajors smeared on their bodies to protect them from bullets.⁵⁵⁸ Kondewa was not a fighter,⁵⁵⁹ he himself never went to the war front⁵⁶⁰ or into active combat,⁵⁶¹ but whenever a Kamajor was going to war, he would go to Kondewa for advice and blessing.⁵⁶² Kondewa's role was to decide whether a Kamajor could go to the war front that day. Before combat, the Kamajors would go in a line and Kondewa would say, "You, don't go to war this time." Although, he could say, "don't go [...] you go", it was similar to a fortune teller saying so.⁵⁶³

346. The Kamajors believed in the mystical powers of the initiators, especially Kondewa, and that the process of the initiation and immunisation would make them "bullet-proof".⁵⁶⁴ The Kamajors looked up to Kondewa and admired the man with such powers.⁵⁶⁵ They believed that he was capable of transferring his powers to them to protect them.⁵⁶⁶ Because of the mystical powers Kondewa possessed, he had command over the Kamajors from every part of the country. No

⁵⁵⁴ Transcript of 17 February 2005, TF2-222, pp. 86-87; Transcript of 26 May 2005, TF2-079, p. 43; Transcript of 8 November 2004, TF2-096, p. 16.

⁵⁵⁵ Transcript of 16 February 2005, TF2-005, p. 55 (CS); Transcript of 17 February 2005, TF2-222, pp. 96-97.

⁵⁵⁶ Transcript of 26 May 2005, TF2-079, pp. 43-44; Transcript of 16 November 2004, TF2-008, pp. 48-49; Transcript of 23 November 2004, TF2-008, p. 57; Transcript of 3 February 2006, Samuel Hinga Norman, p. 45; Transcript of 6 February 2006, Samuel Hinga Norman, pp. 102-103.

⁵⁵⁷ Transcript of 10 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, p. 19.

⁵⁵⁸ Transcript of 4 November 2004, TF2-201, p. 107 (CS).

⁵⁵⁹ Transcript of 15 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, p. 46.

⁵⁶⁰ Transcript of 16 November 2004, TF2-008, p. 50.

⁵⁶¹ Transcript of 23 November 2004, TF2-008, p. 58.

⁵⁶² Transcript of 23 November 2004, TF2-008, pp. 58-60.

⁵⁶³ Transcript of 23 November 2004, TF2-008, pp. 58-60.

⁵⁶⁴ Transcript of 25 May 2006, Lahai Koroma, p. 7; Transcript of 18 February 2005, TF2-222, pp. 19-22; Transcript of 1 June 2006, Joseph Kavura Kongomoh, pp. 56-57; Transcript of 21 February 2006, Lt. General Richards, p. 63, pp. 106-107; Transcript of 17 September 2004, TF2-082, pp. 3-6.

⁵⁶⁵ Transcript of 17 February 2005, TF2-222, p. 119; Transcript of 12 May 2006, Haroun Collier, p. 13; Transcript of 17 February 2006, Osman Vandi, p. 105.

⁵⁶⁶ Transcript of 10 February 2005, Bobor Tucker, p. 45; Transcript of 4 November 2004, TF2-201, p. 113 (CS); Transcript of 18 May 2006, Keikula Amara, pp. 69-70.

Kamajor would go to war without Kondewa's blessing.⁵⁶⁷ For example, he did this for the Kamajors leaving Base Zero for Tongo.⁵⁶⁸

347. Kondewa had bodyguards at Base Zero because of his importance as an initiator within the hunters' society.⁵⁶⁹ One of his bodyguards was a child soldier.⁵⁷⁰ Kondewa had a house in Nyandahun, which was about a quarter mile from Talia.⁵⁷¹

2.2.11.4. CDF Structure at the National Level

348. During the time of the existence of Base Zero, there were a few positions of Directors within the CDF hierarchy. The Director of War was deputised by his Deputy. This position was occupied by Mohamed Orinco Moosa at least as of December 1997.⁵⁷² The National Director of Operations was below the Deputy Director of War.⁵⁷³ During the existence of Base Zero, Joseph Koroma first occupied this position.⁵⁷⁴ He was an elderly person and was given the position to be appeased. Albert J Nallo who was the Deputy to the National Director of Operations⁵⁷⁵ did all the work because Koroma was illiterate and was largely dormant and inactive.⁵⁷⁶ In early January 1998 Lamin Ngobeh became the National Director of Operations.⁵⁷⁷ Despite the existence of the formal structure which presupposed the flow of command from Norman down to Nallo through Fofana, Orinco Moosa and Joseph Koroma, the normal flow of command did not go through these persons. Nallo was also not permanently based at Base Zero and would come and go to the warfronts.⁵⁷⁸

⁵⁶⁷ Transcript of 16 November 2004, TF2-008, pp. 49-50.

⁵⁶⁸ Transcript of 4 November 2004, TF2-201, p. 107 (CS).

⁵⁶⁹ Transcript of 3 February 2006, Samuel Hinga Norman, p. 74; Transcript of 15 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, pp. 46-47; See also Transcript of 8 June 2005, TF2-011, pp. 45-47 (CS); Transcript of 8 November 2004, TF2-096, p. 28.

⁵⁷⁰ Transcript of 27 May 2005, TF2-079, p. 13.

⁵⁷¹ Transcript of 18 February 2005, TF2-222, pp. 49-50; Transcript of 11 October 2006, JD Murana, pp. 32-33 and 45.

⁵⁷² Transcript of 26 May 2005, TF2-079, p. 40; Transcript of 4 November 2004, pp. 88-90 (CS); Transcript of 11 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, pp. 24-27; Transcript of 15 February 2005, TF2-005, pp. 92-93 (CS).

⁵⁷³ Transcript of 11 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, p. 24.

⁵⁷⁴ Transcript of 11 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, p. 24.

⁵⁷⁵ Transcript of 10 March, Albert J Nallo, p. 32.

⁵⁷⁶ Transcript of 11 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, pp. 59-60.

⁵⁷⁷ Transcript of 4 November 2004, p. 113 (CS).

⁵⁷⁸ Transcript of 11 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, pp. 60-61.

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349. The job of deciding when and where to go to war lay with Norman, Kondewa, Fofana, the Deputy Director of War, the Director of Operations, his deputy, and the battalion commanders.⁵⁷⁹

350. In his position as the Deputy National Director of Operations, Nallo had five roles: 1) transmit general and specific instructions from Norman to the warfront;⁵⁸⁰ 2) collect reports from the warfront, both written and verbal, and bring them to Base Zero to Fofana before giving them to Norman; if they were written, he would sit with Fofana and go over them before taking them to Norman; 3) take arms and ammunitions to the warfront for the fighters; 4) visit the frontlines to receive reports and ascertain the position of the troops; and 5) plan with Fofana strategies for war operations for the Southern Region because Fofana was illiterate.⁵⁸¹

351. While at Base Zero, apart from the Directors at the national level, there were a few regional positions within the CDF structure: Musa Junisa was the Director of Operations for the Eastern Region, Dr. Mohamed Mansaray was the Director of Operations for the Northern Region, Pa Lungba was the Director of Operations for the Western Region,⁵⁸² and Nallo, in addition to being the Deputy National Director of Operations, was the Director of Operations for the Southern Region. The latter included the districts of Bo, Bonthe, Moyamba and Pujehun.⁵⁸³

352. Nallo was appointed by Norman at Base Zero to hold both positions of the Deputy National Director of Operations and the Director of Operations for the Southern Region.⁵⁸⁴ As the Director of Operations for the Southern Region, Nallo took general and specific instructions from Norman and passed them to the warfront.⁵⁸⁵ In the same capacity, Nallo would arrange the Kamajors wherever they had an operation.⁵⁸⁶ He was in charge of the commanders in the Southern Region but he did not have full or strict control of them, especially because of their large numbers. Particularly, he was unable to control the Special Forces and Vanjawai. Nallo was responsible for implementing the commands he received from Base Zero along with his commanders. In implementing commands, he did not distinguish between lawful and unlawful ones and did not

⁵⁷⁹ Transcript of 23 November 2004, TF2-008, p. 11; Transcript of 15 February 2005, TF2-005, pp. 93-94 (CS).

⁵⁸⁰ See Transcript of 27 January 2006, Samuel Hinga Norman, p. 99.

⁵⁸¹ Transcript of 10 March, Albert J Nallo, pp. 32-35.

⁵⁸² Transcript of 11 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, pp. 25-26.

⁵⁸³ Transcript of 10 March, Albert J Nallo, p. 32; Transcript of 17 November 2004, TF2-008, pp. 40-41.

⁵⁸⁴ Transcript of 10 March, Albert J Nallo, p. 32.

⁵⁸⁵ Transcript of 10 March, Albert J Nallo, p. 32.

⁵⁸⁶ Transcript of 11 May 2006, Joe Nunie, pp. 53-54.

recognise that he had discretion to not implement them.⁵⁸⁷ Nallo went to his operational areas of command three times per week from Base Zero on his Honda motorbike.⁵⁸⁸

353. Norman also developed a system of administrative command through the position of Regional Coordinator. Alhaji Daramy Rogers occupied the position for the Southern Region, Jambawai for the Eastern Region and Dumbuya for the Northern Region. These individuals oversaw the distribution of food and welfare items to the Kamajors in their respective regions.⁵⁸⁹

2.2.11.5. CDF Structure at the Regional Level

354. Since the formation of the Kamajor society in 1991, the Kamajors were organised essentially as a group of native hunters who responded to the directives of the chiefs and chiefdom authorities when being requested to protect people from the rebels and to defend their chiefdoms.⁵⁹⁰ Paramount chiefs would select people in their respective chiefdoms to become Kamajors.⁵⁹¹

355. At the level of the village, the Kamajors appointed their leader/commander usually from either ex-servicemen or strong and active men in the community. At the chiefdom level, the paramount chiefs and their sub-chiefs brought the Kamajors together under one umbrella called "chiefdom Kamajors". Hence, they were under the command and control of the chiefdom authorities led by their paramount chief or regent chief. Therefore, requests for the special services of the Kamajors frequently came through the chiefs.⁵⁹² A commander did not have a strict number of men under his command and the number depended upon the available number of men in the various chiefdoms.⁵⁹³

356. Upon his arrival at Base Zero, Norman attempted to synchronise the command structure, so that everyone could abide by the centralised commands coming from Base Zero. At that time the Kamajors were still operating in different groups according to which chiefdom they hailed

⁵⁸⁷ Transcript of 11 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, pp. 96-98; Transcript of 14 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, pp. 20-21.

⁵⁸⁸ Transcript of 11 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, pp. 103-104.

⁵⁸⁹ Transcript of 15 February 2005, p. 93 (CS); Transcript of 16 February 2005, pp. 17-18 (CS).

⁵⁹⁰ Transcript of 17 February 2005, TF2-222, pp. 13, 15 and 17 (CS); Transcript of 9 February 2006, Albert Joe Demby, p. 103.

⁵⁹¹ Transcript of 3 February 2006, Samuel Hinga Norman, p. 72; Transcript of 16 November 2004, TF2-008, pp. 51-53.

⁵⁹² Transcript of 10 February 2006, Albert Joe Demby, p. 7; Exhibit 165, para. C.I.d.

⁵⁹³ Transcript of 6 February 2006, Samuel Hinga Norman, p. 108.

from.⁵⁹⁴ Positions of a town or a village commander, section commander in charge of one section of a chiefdom, and chiefdom commander in charge of an entire chiefdom still existed.⁵⁹⁵

357. Norman introduced some military terminology and concept into the organisation and the structure of the CDF, such as, division of Kamajors by sections, squads, platoons and companies, varying in size from three to 75-100 men.⁵⁹⁶ Positions of battalion and senior battalion commanders were introduced to replace the terminology of chiefdom and district commanders. A new system of appointments was adopted around the end of December 1997, when around 100 to 150 commanders from various chiefdoms, who were considered fit to take up command responsibility, were called to Base Zero to go through the screening and appointment process to be promoted to the rank of battalion and senior battalion commanders.⁵⁹⁷ A chiefdom / battalion commander reported to a district commander, while the latter would in turn tell the chiefdom / battalion commander where to deploy the Kamajors.⁵⁹⁸ The district commanders reported to the Regional Directors of Operations.⁵⁹⁹

358. Although the CDF was regarded as a cohesive force under one central command, there were some fighters who acted on their own without the knowledge of the central command because their area of operation was so wide.⁶⁰⁰ Commanders' authority to discipline their men on the ground was entirely their own. The CDF also did not keep records of its members like a conventional army would.⁶⁰¹ There were literally hundreds of groups spread throughout the country and they would communicate through their commanders. Commanders went to Base Zero from every group and location in the country and received training, facilities and instruction. Instructions came from the High Command or the National Coordinator.⁶⁰²

2.2.11.6. Death Squad

⁵⁹⁴ Transcript of 14 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, p. 21.

⁵⁹⁵ Transcript of 30 January 2006, Samuel Hinga Norman, pp. 3-5.

⁵⁹⁶ The Kamajors were divided into sections, squads and platoons varying in size from three to a company of 75-100 men, the latter organised on the level of chiefdoms. See Transcript of 30 January 2006, Samuel Hinga Norman, pp. 3-4.

⁵⁹⁷ Transcript of 30 January 2006, Samuel Hinga Norman, pp. 3-6; See for example Exhibit 10, confidential.

⁵⁹⁸ Transcript of 17 February 2006, MT Collier, pp. 18-20 and 61-63.

⁵⁹⁹ Transcript of 17 February 2006, MT Collier, pp. 62-63.

⁶⁰⁰ Transcript of 16 February 2005, TF2-005, p. 70 (CS).

⁶⁰¹ Transcript of 3 February 2006, Samuel Hinga Norman, p. 73.

⁶⁰² Transcript of 17 November 2004, TF2-008, pp. 10-11.

359. The Death Squad was formed at the meeting held by Kamoh Lahai Bangura in Talia,⁶⁰³ prior to the arrival of Norman.⁶⁰⁴ Bobor Tucker, a.k.a. Jegbeyama, was the leader of this group.⁶⁰⁵ The Death Squad originally had 20 members and had grown to have 42 members by the time that Norman arrived in Talia.⁶⁰⁶ Bobor Tucker was based at Tisana and the Death Squad was based at Sumbuya Junction.⁶⁰⁷

360. The Death Squad was responsible for the security in and around Talia, which was later called Base Zero. The Death Squad would patrol the area and ensured that any group wanting to launch an attack on Base Zero was prevented from doing so. In addition to acting as security, the Death Squad would participate in armed attacks against the junta.⁶⁰⁸ After Bobor Tucker was introduced to Norman at Talia, he received orders for these attacks from Norman alone.⁶⁰⁹ The Death Squad was under Norman's control,⁶¹⁰ and was answerable and reporting only to Norman.⁶¹¹ Norman was their "direct boss".⁶¹²

361. Although, originally the duty of the Death Squad was to provide security in and around Base Zero, this was not the work they were actually doing.⁶¹³ They were responsible for arresting undisciplined people⁶¹⁴ and for torturing and killing people,⁶¹⁵ especially captives.⁶¹⁶ They also

⁶⁰³ Transcript of 10 February 2005, Bobor Tucker, pp. 31-38; see section V.2.2.2.1.

⁶⁰⁴ Transcript of 31 January 2006, Samuel Hinga Norman, pp. 15-16.

⁶⁰⁵ Transcript of 10 February 2005, Bobor Tucker, p. 32; Transcript of 4 November 2004, TF2-201, pp. 98-99 (CS); Transcript of 16 November 2004, TF2-008, pp. 60-61; Transcript of 11 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, p. 23; Transcript of 17 February 2006, MT Collier, pp. 52-53.

⁶⁰⁶ Transcript of 10 February 2005, Bobor Tucker, pp. 31-32 and 59.

⁶⁰⁷ Transcript of 12 October 2006, JD Murana, pp. 3-6; Transcript of 15 May 2006, Haroun Collier, p. 35.

⁶⁰⁸ Transcript of 8 June 2005, TF2-011, pp. 21-22 (CS); Transcript of 10 February 2005, Bobor Tucker, pp. 33-35.

⁶⁰⁹ Transcript of 10 February 2005, Bobor Tucker, p. 35; Transcript of 4 November 2004, TF2-201, pp. 99-100 (CS).

⁶¹⁰ Transcript of 17 November 2004, TF2-068, pp. 90-91 (CS).

⁶¹¹ Transcript of 10 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, p. 38; Transcript 11 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, p. 23; Transcript 8 June 2005, TF2-011, pp. 21-22 (CS).

⁶¹² Transcript of 11 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, p. 23.

⁶¹³ Transcript of 14 March, Albert J Nallo, p. 42.

⁶¹⁴ Transcript of 18 February 2005, TF2-222, pp. 8-9.

⁶¹⁵ Transcript of 10 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, p. 38; Transcript of 14 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, p. 43; Transcript of 16 November 2004, TF2-008, pp. 60-63; Transcript of 15 February 2005, TF2-005, pp. 95-98 (CS); See for example Transcript of 26 May 2005, TF2-079, pp. 48-49: The Death Squad was killing people for their diamonds and was looting around Bumpch.

⁶¹⁶ Transcript of 10 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, p. 38; see also Section 2.5.3.3.6; Transcript of 10 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, pp. 85-87; Transcript of 22 November 2004, TF2-017, pp. 18-21 (CS).

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looted properties⁶¹⁷ and brought them to Norman⁶¹⁸ and molested and threatened War Council members.⁶¹⁹ Their actions were “abnormal”, “horrible” and “beyond bounds”.⁶²⁰

2.2.11.7. Special Forces

362. The Special Forces were the bodyguards of Norman, Kondewa and Fofana and they took care of Base Zero.⁶²¹ Later, the Special Forces were composed of both Liberians and Sierra Leoneans. They were permanently based at Base Zero and accompanied Norman wherever he went. They reported to Norman.⁶²²

2.2.11.8. ECOMOG

363. When ECOMOG and the CDF joined forces, the CDF remained independent because they were regionally separated in the country. ECOMOG was in Lungi and Freetown while the CDF was in the south and east.⁶²³

2.2.12. Structure and Organisation of the CDF / Kamajors Post Base Zero

364. On 10 March 1998, President Kabbah returned to Sierra Leone and the Kabbah government resumed its functions.⁶²⁴ At this time, several changes were made to the organisation, structure and administration of the CDF.⁶²⁵

365. The War Council left Base Zero in February 1998 to set up regional CDF offices in Bo and Kenema Districts.⁶²⁶ The administrative authority of the CDF was transferred to these offices and

⁶¹⁷ TF2-011 testified that the Death Squad raided a car in Sembahun and brought it to Talia: Transcript of 8 June 2005, TF2-011, pp. 22-23 (CS); See also Transcript of 16 November 2004, TF2-008, p. 62; Transcript of 26 May 2005, TF2-079, pp. 48-49.

⁶¹⁸ Transcript of 14 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, p. 42.

⁶¹⁹ Transcript of 14 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, p. 42; Transcript of 15 February 2005, TF2-005, pp. 100-101 (CS).

⁶²⁰ Transcript of 16 November 2004, TF2-008, p. 60, lines 21-24.

⁶²¹ Transcript of 16 November 2004, TF2-008, p. 63.

⁶²² Transcript of 11 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, p. 28; Transcript of 10 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, pp. 86-87.

⁶²³ Transcript of 14 November 2004, TF2-008, p. 30.

⁶²⁴ Transcript of 26 January 2006, Sam Hinga Norman, pp. 77-78; Transcript of 8 February 2006, Peter Penfold, p. 43.

⁶²⁵ Transcript of 26 January 2006, Sam Hinga Norman, pp. 72-75.

⁶²⁶ See sections V.2.5.5 and V.2.7.8.1.





the CDF High Command ceased to exist at Base Zero.⁶²⁷ The War Council continued to act in a limited capacity for another two months, finally disbanding in April 1998.⁶²⁸

366. The CDF offices were run by the Regional Coordinators. Alhaji Daramy Rogers, the Regional Coordinator for the Southern Region, was stationed in Bo. Jambawai, the Regional Coordinator for the Eastern Region, was stationed in Kenema. Around June 1998, the position of Regional Coordinator was abolished. In its stead, the position of District Administrator was created and was held by Kosseh Hindowa in Bo and Arthur Koroma in Kenema. The District Administrators received reports from the battalion commanders, and then reported directly to Norman.⁶²⁹ Their functions included, for examples, distribution of rice and logistics.⁶³⁰

367. Sometime after 10 March 1998, control of all military matters, including the CDF forces was transferred to General Khobe, the Chief of Defence Staff of the Sierra Leone Army ("SLA").⁶³¹ He was later joined by ECOMOG commander General Shelpidi. The two men took orders from President Kabbah and worked together to manage the daily fighting across the country.⁶³² Although ECOMOG assumed command responsibility over Kamajors in Bo and Kenema in late February at the end of these operations, it remains doubtful whether ECOMOG exercised effective control over the Kamajors' actions. There are only a few examples of ECOMOG officers disciplining Kamajors and these efforts were largely unsuccessful.⁶³³

2.2.12.1. The National Coordinating Committee

⁶²⁷ Transcript of January 26 2006, Sam Hinga Norman, pp. 72-75; See also sections V.2.5.5 and V.2.7.8.1.

⁶²⁸ Transcript of 14 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, pp. 11-16; Transcript of 5 May 2006, Mustapha Lumeh, p. 81. The War Council held its last meeting in Kenema in April 1998. Though it continued to function during that time, the War Council's suggestions were largely ignored and most members had returned to their various towns and villages. Exhibit 129; Transcript of 13 February 2006, Albert Joe Demby, pp. 4-6. On 9 March 1999, the War Council, having been superseded by the NCC, was officially abolished.

⁶²⁹ Transcript of 3 May 2006, Arthur Koroma, pp. 39-41; Transcript of 4 May 2006, Arthur Koroma, p. 105; Transcript of 16 September 2004, pp. 50-51 (CS): For example, the battalion commander in Koribondo reported to Alhaji Daramy Rogers in Bo. When the position of Regional Coordinator was abolished, he made his reports to Kosseh Hindowa, the District Administrator.

⁶³⁰ Exhibit 87.

⁶³¹ Transcript of 10 February 2006, Albert Joe Demby, pp. 52-53 and 70; Transcript of 26 January 2006, Samuel Hinga Norman, pp. 46 and 54; Transcript of 14 June 2005, Colonel Richard Iron, p. 47; Transcript of 13 February 2006, Albert Joe Demby, p. 7: Military matters included deployment, supply of arms and ammunition and supply of food which was stored in military warehouses. These items were distributed through the use of military helicopters.

⁶³² Transcript of 21 February 2006, Lt. General Richards, p. 101; Transcript of 13 February 2006, Albert Joe Demby, pp. 9-10.

⁶³³ See e.g. section V.2.5.4.1.15 and Exhibit 89.

368. The National Coordinating Committee (“NCC”) was formed by President Kabbah on 29 January 1999. It became the highest body in the CDF and was chaired by the then Vice President of Sierra Leone, Albert Joe Demby.⁶³⁴ The NCC was an administrative body responsible for providing food and other welfare items to the CDF fighters. It was not part of the military.⁶³⁵

369. In his capacity as Deputy Minister of Defence, Norman attended meetings of the NCC. However, he was not a member of the NCC and was under the NCC's control. He did not discuss military matters with President Kabbah.⁶³⁶

2.2.12.2. Roles of Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa

370. Fofana retained the title of Director of War and was responsible for distributing logistics to the various parts of the country. The position was later incorporated into the organisation of the NCC and Fofana then acted under the authority of the NCC.⁶³⁷ He was not responsible for the conduct of the war and the fighting forces.⁶³⁸ Sometime in mid-1999, he became the Director of the Peace Office in Bo.⁶³⁹

371. Sometime after 10 March 1998, Kondewa founded and led the *Avondo* society together with Sheku Kaillie, a.k.a. Bombowai. The “cabinet” and subordinate members of the society were Kamoh Gboni, Kamoh Fuwad, Gibrilla, CO Makossi, Hallie Namoi and Woodie. They were known as the “cabinet” because they sat together and were responsible for marking the bodies of initiates.⁶⁴⁰

372. The children who were initiated into the *Avondo* society acted differently. They did not want to be touched by or stand near female teachers. They did not want to hold a sweeping brush, unlike other children who would sweep at the schools. They began to show violent behaviour and

⁶³⁴ Transcript of 10 February 2006, Albert Joe Demby, p.55; Exhibit 127; Transcript of 27 May 2005, TF2-079, pp. 22-24; Exhibit 120.

⁶³⁵ Transcript of 27 May 2005, TF2-079, p. 24; Transcript of 16 February 2006, Albert Joe Demby, pp. 7-8.

⁶³⁶ Transcript of 21 February 2006, Lt. General Richards, p. 101; Transcript of 6 February 2006, Samuel Hinga Norman, p.66; Exhibit 123.

⁶³⁷ Exhibit 123.

⁶³⁸ Transcript of 6 February 2006, Sam Hinga Norman, pp. 62-66.

⁶³⁹ Transcript of 23 November 2004, TF2-008, pp. 23-28; see section V.2.5.5.2.

⁶⁴⁰ Transcript of 10 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, pp. 19-21 and 28-30; Transcript of 16 June 2005, TF2-EW2, pp. 21-22 and 90-91 (CS); Transcript of 3 November 2004, TF2-021, pp. 20-21 and 49.

acted like they were better than the other children - even the other children that had been initiated into the CDF.⁶⁴¹

373. Kondewa also became part of the organisation of the NCC and continued to act as High Priest under the NCC's control.⁶⁴² Sometime in February or March 1999, Kondewa was removed from his position as High Priest and was replaced by Kamoh Lahai Bangura. President Kabbah was notified and he approved the replacement.⁶⁴³

2.3. Towns of Tongo Field

2.3.1. Background to Tongo Field

374. Tongo is a mining town in Lower Bambara Chiefdom in Kenema District.⁶⁴⁴ The Kamajors and the SLA were both present and mined in Tongo from 1996 until the Coup of 25 May 1997. After 25 May, Kamajors alone occupied Tongo.⁶⁴⁵

375. The AFRC and RUF forces collectively attacked Tongo on 11 August 1997 and occupied it until January 1998.⁶⁴⁶ When the AFRC was in Tongo, they forced civilians to mine diamonds for them and killed those who refused.⁶⁴⁷ Although the Kamajors were driven out of Tongo Town, they remained in the surrounding towns, which are collectively known as "towns of Tongo Field". The Kamajors launched numerous armed operations against the rebels in an attempt to regain control over Tongo.⁶⁴⁸

⁶⁴¹ Transcript of 16 June 2005, TF2-EW2, pp. 21-22 and 90-91. See also Transcript of 3 November 2004, TF2-021, pp. 20-21 and 49: TF2-021 testified that *Avondo* means that "when you go to the warfront, the medicine enters your body as you sweat".

⁶⁴² Exhibit 123.

⁶⁴³ Transcript of 3 February 2006, Sam Hinga Norman, pp. 45-46.

⁶⁴⁴ Transcript of 11 February 2005, TF2-022, p. 37, Transcript of 26 May 2005, TF2-079, p. 17

⁶⁴⁵ Transcript of 15 May 2006, BJK Sei, p. 80, Transcript of 18 February 2005, TF2-027, pp. 77-78, Transcript of 16 May 2006, Siaka Lahai, pp. 89-90. Note that there is also testimony from TF2-222 and TF2-022 that the SLA was not in Tongo until August 1997; Transcript of 4 November 2004, TF2-201, p. 71; Transcript of 11 February 2005, TF2-022, pp. 74-75

⁶⁴⁶ Transcript of 1 March 2005, TF2-053, p. 72, Transcript of 18 February 2005, TF2-027, pp. 77-78

⁶⁴⁷ Transcript of 22 February 2005, TF2-027, pp. 70-71, Transcript of 22 February 2005, TF2-027, p. 10, Transcript of 18 February 2005, TF2-027, pp. 78-79

⁶⁴⁸ Exhibit 86, confidential; see also evidence of Norman that the attack on Tongo would determine who the winner or the loser of the war would be, Transcript of 17 February 2005, TF2-222, p. 110

2.3.2. Attacks on Tongo Town

376. Numerous attacks were launched by Kamajors on Tongo Town, however, the evidence led by the Parties focused mainly on three distinct attacks. For ease of reference, the Chamber refers below to these attacks as the first, second and third attacks on Tongo Town.

377. On 16 November 1997 TF2-079 prepared a situation report on events occurring between 19 September and 13 November 1997 in Zone II Operational Frontline which included Lower Bambara and Dodo Chiefdoms. It requested arms and ammunitions and described attacks which had been launched in the area. It also narrated the following killing which was committed by Kamajors:

On 9 November 1997, Siaka Lahai and eight of his Kamajor militia were patrolling Gboegiamia Village armed with assault rifles and an RPG launcher.⁶⁴⁹ The Kamajors entered the village and captured Robert Ndanema, who was in possession of a large number of AFRC market due tickets. Mr. Ndanema admitted complicity with the rebels and was summarily executed.⁶⁵⁰

378. The report was endorsed by Musa Junisa, the then Commander-in-chief of Zone II Operational Frontline and Mohamed Orinco Moosa, his deputy. TF2-079, Junisa and Moosa with 100 other Kamajors then travelled to Base Zero. At Base Zero they gave the report first to Fofana and then to Norman. Norman commended their efforts and told them that a good number of that group should return to the area with another senior commander to keep the area strong and only a few of them should remain at Base Zero to await ammunitions. Seven people, including Moosa and TF2-079 stayed at Base Zero.⁶⁵¹

379. Around November 1997, while the rebels occupied Tongo and the Kamajors were headquartered in Panguma, Kamajors killed a small boy who had been travelling on foot from Tongo to Panguma. The boy was killed because he was coming from rebel-held territory.⁶⁵²

380. The first attack on Tongo Town was launched in late November or early December 1997.⁶⁵³ Key commanders included Mohamed Kailondo Banya, Keikula Amara, a.k.a. Kamabote,

⁶⁴⁹ Siaka Lahai testified that there is no village named Gboegiamia in the Tongo Field area, but that there is a village named Gbongema. Transcript of 17 May 2006, Siaka Lahai, pp. 46-47.

⁶⁵⁰ Exhibit 86, confidential; Transcript of 26 May 2005, TF2-079, pp. 33-34.

⁶⁵¹ Transcript of 26 May 2005, pp. 24-28, pp. 33-36; Exhibit 86, confidential.

⁶⁵² Transcript of 26 May 2005, TF2-079, pp. 22-23 and 34-35.





and Siaka Lahai.⁶⁵⁴ Kamabote was the Base Commander in Talama, a town about ten miles from Tongo.⁶⁵⁵ Siaka Lahai was a Battalion Commander for the Lower Bambara Chiefdom who was stationed in Panguma and surrounding towns.⁶⁵⁶ The purpose of this first attack was to determine the rebels' location rather than to fight.⁶⁵⁷

381. As found by the Chamber in section V.2.2.10.1, a passing out parade was held between 10 and 12 December 1997 at Base Zero during which Norman addressed the Kamajors. He ordered them to attack and retake Tongo because it was thought that possession of Tongo would determine the outcome of the war.⁶⁵⁸ In January 1998, the second and third attacks on Tongo were launched by Kamajors.⁶⁵⁹

382. The local planning for the second attack was done in Panguma and was hosted by BJK Sei, the Chiefdom Commander for the Lower Bambara Chiefdom.⁶⁶⁰ The plan was to divide Tongo into four sections and to have four commanders, including Kamabote and Siaka Lahai, attack from four separate directions.⁶⁶¹ After this attack failed, the same commanders regrouped in Panguma and returned to Tongo for the third time, taking the town.⁶⁶² This last attack took place around 14 January 1998.⁶⁶³

2.3.3. Crimes Committed During and Subsequent to the Second Attack on Tongo

2.3.3.1. Talama and Panguma after the Second Attack on Tongo

383. The second attack on Tongo was launched late one morning in early January 1998.⁶⁶⁴ More than 1000 civilians attempting to flee the attack were detained at a rebel checkpoint along the Kenema Highway. At some point, 47 Kamajors led by Kamabote attacked the checkpoint and the

⁶⁵³ Transcript of 18 February 2005, TF2-027, p. 79.

⁶⁵⁴ Transcript of 15 May 2006, BJK Sei, pp. 3-4; Transcript of 17 May 2006, Siaka Lahai, p. 6.

⁶⁵⁵ Confidential Exhibit 86, SCSL Registry p. 3723.

⁶⁵⁶ Exhibit 86, confidential.

⁶⁵⁷ Transcript of 18 May 2006, Keikula Amara, p. 25.

⁶⁵⁸ Transcript of 17 February 2005, TF2-222, p. 110.

⁶⁵⁹ Transcript of 17 May 2006, Siaka Lahai, p. 5; Transcript of 16 May 2006, BJK Sei, pp. 2 and 28.

⁶⁶⁰ Transcript of 17 May 2006, Siaka Lahai, pp. 40-41.

⁶⁶¹ Transcript of 18 May 2006, Keikula Amara, pp. 23 and 25.

⁶⁶² Transcript of 18 May 2006, Keikula Amara, pp. 33 and 35.

⁶⁶³ Transcript of 15 May 2006, BJK Sei, p. 84, Transcript of 23 May 2006, Brima Moriba, p. 8

⁶⁶⁴ Transcript of 18 May 2006, Keikula Amara, pp. 33-34; Transcript of 01 March 2005, TF2-053, p. 74; Transcript of 14 February 2005, TF2-035, p. 8.

rebels fled.⁶⁶⁵ Kamabote and his Kamajors took control of the civilians and led them towards Kenema.⁶⁶⁶

384. Along the road to Kenema, Kamabote redirected the civilians to Panguma. He stopped them in Talama, a small town outside Panguma, and ordered them to place all of their belongings on the side of the road.⁶⁶⁷ He then ordered his Kamajors to search the belongings as well as the civilians' pockets. All of the property found was taken to a house in Talama and kept there.⁶⁶⁸

385. After searching their belongings, the Kamajors ordered the civilians to form queues according to their tribes. Loko, Limba and Temne tribe members were ordered to form one queue, which contained 150 men and one 12-year-old boy named Foday Koroma.⁶⁶⁹ Madingo, Susu and Fullah tribe members were ordered to form a second queue and Mende, Sherbro and Kissy tribe members were ordered to form a third one.⁶⁷⁰

386. Kamabote asked 12-year-old Foday Koroma what tribe he belonged to and the boy responded that he was a Loko. The boy also said that he was related to Akim, a rebel based in Tongo. Kamabote responded by striking him on the head with a machete, killing him.⁶⁷¹ The remaining Lokos, Limbas and Temnes were taken 20 to 25 feet away and Kamabote ordered his Kamajors to kill them. They used cutlasses to kill each of the 150 people in the queue. Afterwards, the Kamajors slit open the stomach of one victim and displayed his entrails in a bucket before the remaining civilians.⁶⁷²

387. The civilians that were not killed remained under Kamabote's control. He took them to the hospital quarters in Panguma where BJK Sei addressed them. BJK Sei told the civilians that the Kamajors were unable to capture Tongo during the second attack, but that they would attack again, and would kill everyone that had not left the town. BJK Sei summoned an imam from Tongo and gave him a letter containing this warning to take to Tongo.⁶⁷³ BJK Sei eventually told

⁶⁶⁵ Transcript of 18 May 2006, Keikula Amara, p. 73; Transcript of 14 February 2005, TF2-035, pp. 11-12.

⁶⁶⁶ Transcript of 14 February 2005, TF2-035, p. 12.

⁶⁶⁷ Transcript of 14 February 2005, TF2-035, pp. 12-13.

⁶⁶⁸ Transcript of 14 February 2005, TF2-035, p. 15.

⁶⁶⁹ Transcript of 01 March 2005, TF2-053, p. 89; Transcript of 14 February 2005, TF2-035, pp. 16-18.

⁶⁷⁰ Transcript of 14 February 2005, TF2-035, p. 56.

⁶⁷¹ Transcript of 01 March 2005, TF2-053, p. 89.

⁶⁷² Transcript of 14 February 2005, TF2-035, pp. 18, 20.

⁶⁷³ Transcript of 14 February 2005, TF2-035, pp. 21-22

the rest of the civilians that anyone with a home or a relative elsewhere should go there because he did not have the resources to host people on a war front.⁶⁷⁴

388. One member of the group of civilians detained by Kamabote, TF2-035, knew a Kamajor commander named Baggey Waters in Panguma. BJK Sei allowed them to leave together.⁶⁷⁵ Sometime later, TF2-035 and Baggey Waters settled together in Ngiehun.⁶⁷⁶ TF2-035 had been living there for some time when Kamabote arrived and discovered that he was a Limba and had been a member of the group taken from Tongo.⁶⁷⁷ TF2-035 had survived the killing of Limbas in Talama by claiming to be a Madingo.⁶⁷⁸ Kamabote gave a single-barrel bullet to a 12-year-old boy named "Small Hunter" and ordered him to kill TF2-035. Two Kamajors intervened on TF2-035's behalf but their efforts were unsuccessful.⁶⁷⁹ "Small Hunter" shot TF2-035 five times, but he managed to escape into the bush.⁶⁸⁰ One bullet is still in his body.⁶⁸¹

2.3.4. Crimes Committed During and Subsequent to the Third Attack on Tongo

2.3.4.1. Gathering of Civilians at the National Diamond Mining Corporation Headquarters

389. The Kamajors launched a third attack on Tongo in the afternoon of 14 January 1998.⁶⁸² Many civilians had received warnings that the Kamajors were planning the attack and most of those that were able to leave had done so.⁶⁸³ TF2-144 attempted to escape Tongo when the attack began, but was stopped by Kamajors outside his home. The Kamajors took his bag of belongings and ordered him to join a line of civilians and to go to the National Diamond Mining Corporation headquarters in town ("NDMC Headquarters").⁶⁸⁴

⁶⁷⁴ Transcript of 18 May 2006, Keikula Amara, p. 28; Transcript of 16 May 2006, BJK Sei, pp. 21-22.

⁶⁷⁵ Transcript of 14 February 2005, TF2-035, pp. 22-23.

⁶⁷⁶ Transcript of 14 February 2005, TF2-035, pp. 23-24.

⁶⁷⁷ Transcript of 14 February 2005, TF2-035, p. 25.

⁶⁷⁸ Transcript of 14 February 2005, TF2-035, p. 16.

⁶⁷⁹ Transcript of 14 February 2005, TF2-035, pp. 26 and 28.

⁶⁸⁰ See also para. 688(c).

⁶⁸¹ Transcript of 14 February 2005, TF2-035, p. 27.

⁶⁸² Transcript of 18 May 2006, Keikula Amara, pp. 33, 35; Transcript of 23 February 2005, TF2-048, p. 8, Transcript of 22 February 2005, TF2-047, p. 125.

⁶⁸³ Transcript of 17 May 2006, Siaka Lahai, p. 10; Transcript of 15 May 2006, BJK Sei, p. 84; Transcript of 23 February 2005, TF2-048, p. 27; Transcript of 22 February, TF2-048, pp. 71-72.

⁶⁸⁴ Transcript of 24 February 2005, TF2-144, pp. 60-61. The National Diamond Mining headquarters were also referred to as the "security headquarters" or the "NDMC security headquarters" because the AFRC and RUF were headquartered there when they occupied Tongo. See Transcript of 18 May 2006, Keikula Amara, pp. 77-78; Transcript

390. There was gunfire in Tongo at the beginning of the attack and chaos created by thousands of civilians running toward the NDMC Headquarters.⁶⁸⁵ TF2-027 saw corpses on the side of the road on the way to the headquarters. Some had visible wounds on their bodies and others did not.⁶⁸⁶ TF2-015 was shot while running to the NDMC Headquarters, as were three women that he was running with.⁶⁸⁷ TF2-144 saw the corpse of a man named Joskie lying on the ground; the back of his neck had been chopped at with a machete. TF2-144 also saw the corpse of an unidentified woman, but he was unable to tell whether she had wounds on her body.⁶⁸⁸ After the attack, TF2-027 also saw Joskie Mboma's corpse on the street, as well as three other corpses. TF2-027 recognised one of the corpses as that of a Fullah boy who used to sell bread. This corpse was on its stomach and TF2-027 did not see any marks on the body.⁶⁸⁹

2.3.4.2. 14 January 1998 - NDMC Headquarters

391. Witnesses testified that when they arrived at the NDMC Headquarters they saw hundreds of corpses of men, women and children at the entrance. There were also corpses on the football field inside, where the civilians were gathering.⁶⁹⁰ Inside the NDMC Headquarters, there was an exchange of fire between the Kamajors and the rebels. This fighting continued until the rebels were eventually overpowered and began to retreat; many of the rebels changed into civilian clothing as they ran.⁶⁹¹ Before the rebels snuck away, a bomb dropped amongst the civilians.⁶⁹² After the rebels dispersed, TF2-022 saw a Kamajor with a cutlass chopping at three people who had been lying on the ground to avoid the crossfire.⁶⁹³

of 26 May 2005, TF2-079, p. 63; Transcript of 01 March 2005, TF2-053, p. 75, pp. 91-92; Transcript of 23 February 2005, TF2-048, pp. 27-28; Transcript of 22 February 2005, TF2-047, pp. 47, 76; Transcript of 18 February 2005, TF2-027, p. 89.

⁶⁸⁵ Transcript of 01 March 2005, TF2-053, p. 79; Transcript of 24 February 2005, TF2-144, pp. 61 and 64; Transcript of 23 February 2005, TF2-048, pp. 7-8; Transcript of 22 February 2005, TF2-047, pp. 47-48; Transcript of 22 February 2005, TF2-027, pp.13-14 and 89; Transcript of 11 February 2005, TF2-022, pp. 44-45; Transcript of 11 February 2005, TF2-015, pp. 6-7.

⁶⁸⁶ Transcript of 22 February 2005, TF2-027, p. 14.

⁶⁸⁷ Transcript of 11 February 2005, TF2-015, p. 6.

⁶⁸⁸ Transcript of 24 February 2005, TF2-144, pp. 62-63.

⁶⁸⁹ Transcript of 18 February 2005, TF2-027, pp. 106, 109.

⁶⁹⁰ Transcript of 24 February 2005, TF2-144, p. 64; Transcript of 22 February 2005, TF2-047, p. 48; Transcript of 18 February 2005, TF2-027, pp. 87-88.

⁶⁹¹ Transcript of 01 March 2005, TF2-053, pp. 81 and 92; Transcript of 11 February 2005, TF2-022, pp. 45-46.

⁶⁹² Transcript of 01 March 2005, TF2-053, p. 76.

⁶⁹³ Transcript of 11 February 2005, TF2-022, p. 46.

392. After the rebels retreated, the Kamajors began singing in Mende that they had captured the NDMC Headquarters.⁶⁹⁴ TF2-027, who was hiding in a mosque in town during the attack, was taken at gunpoint to the NDMC Headquarters.⁶⁹⁵ When he arrived there, civilians were being gathered at the football field. BJK Sei entered the field with Siaka Lahai.⁶⁹⁶ BJK Sei told the Kamajors that he would dismiss anyone that he saw killing people. He then left the headquarters and went to Labour Camp, repeating his order to "please be careful about the civilians".⁶⁹⁷ Shortly after this, a group of Kamajors came to the *barri* inside the headquarters.⁶⁹⁸ One Kamajor reported to Norman on a wireless communication set. He said, "[c]hief, chief. We've captured Tongo, we have captured Tongo, and we are now in Tongo."⁶⁹⁹

393. While this was going on, Kamabote stood before the crowd and called on two women to identify rebels.⁷⁰⁰ The women identified two men as rebels and Kamabote shot them both dead.⁷⁰¹ The women were ordered to continue identifying rebels and they pointed out more than 10 men.⁷⁰² The Kamajors stripped these men and handed them over to armed-Kamajors who took them toward Dodoma, which is a place behind the NDMC Headquarters where cows are slaughtered.⁷⁰³ TF2-027 saw Kamajors lead another 200 men and women in the same direction. The members of this group had been identified as rebels and included a rebel youth leader, a woman who sold cookery and a man who sold second-hand clothing.⁷⁰⁴

394. TF2-047 saw a woman named Fatmata Kamara identify a rebel named Dr. Blood to Kamabote.⁷⁰⁵ She complained that he and his colleagues used to eat at her shop without paying.⁷⁰⁶ Kamabote ordered Dr. Blood to sit on the ground and then struck him in the neck and

⁶⁹⁴ Transcript of 18 February 2005, TF2-027, pp. 86-87 and 105.

⁶⁹⁵ Transcript of 18 February 2005, TF2-027, p. 87.

⁶⁹⁶ Transcript of 18 February 2005, TF2-027, p. 92.

⁶⁹⁷ Transcript of 22 February 2005, TF2-047, p. 50.

⁶⁹⁸ Transcript of 18 February 2005, TF2-027, p. 97.

⁶⁹⁹ Transcript of 18 February 2005, TF2-027, pp. 98-99.

⁷⁰⁰ Transcript of 01 March 2005, TF2-053, p. 82.

⁷⁰¹ Transcript of 01 March 2005, TF2-053, pp. 82-83.

⁷⁰² Transcript of 01 March 2005, TF2-053, pp. 83-84.

⁷⁰³ Transcript of 01 March 2005, TF2-053, p. 84; Transcript of 18 February 2005, TF2-027, p. 102.

⁷⁰⁴ Transcript of 18 February 2005, TF2-027, pp. 101-102.

⁷⁰⁵ Transcript of 22 February 2005, TF2-047, pp. 51-52.

⁷⁰⁶ Transcript of 22 February 2005, TF2-047, p. 52.

decapitated him.⁷⁰⁷ Kamabote then killed Fatmata Kamara with a cutlass for having cooked for the rebels.⁷⁰⁸ TF2-047 saw the Kamajors kill another person on that day.⁷⁰⁹

395. TF2-048 testified that she saw Kamajors take her husband's uncle behind a house at the NDMC Headquarters and return with blood on their machetes. She has never seen her husband's uncle again.⁷¹⁰ TF2-048 saw the same thing happen to a woman and a child.⁷¹¹

396. Kamajors led groups of Temne, Loko, Koranko and Limba tribe members away from the football field during the night.⁷¹²

2.3.4.3. 15 January 1998 – NDMC Headquarters

397. On the night of 14 January 1998, the civilians slept at the NDMC Headquarters because they were not allowed to leave.⁷¹³

398. The following morning, TF2-022 saw many corpses in the field. Some of these corpses appeared to have been hacked by a machete, while others did not have any visible injuries.⁷¹⁴ The same morning, TF2-022 recognised a rebel named Cobra in a line of 20 men surrounded by armed Kamajors.⁷¹⁵ The men were accused of being rebels and were taken to an open space in the NDMC Headquarters known as the MP office, where they were all hacked to death. The bodies of these rebels were left where they were killed.⁷¹⁶

399. In a different area of the field, where TF2-048 was staying, everyone except for the Limbas, Lokos and Temnes was allowed to leave.⁷¹⁷ The Kamajors said that the Limbas had tapped wine for the rebels and that they, along with the Lokos and Temnes, should be killed.⁷¹⁸ However, before

⁷⁰⁷ Transcript of 22 February 2005, TF2-047, p. 52.

⁷⁰⁸ Transcript of 22 February 2005, TF2-047, p. 59.

⁷⁰⁹ Transcript of 22 February 2005, TF2-047, p. 58.

⁷¹⁰ Transcript of 23 February 2005, TF2-048, pp. 10-11.

⁷¹¹ Transcript of 23 February 2005, TF2-048, p. 11.

⁷¹² Transcript of 24 February 2005, TF2-144, p. 65.

⁷¹³ Transcript of 23 February 2005, TF2-048, pp. 12-13; Transcript of 11 February 2005, TF2-015, p. 7.

⁷¹⁴ Transcript of 11 February 2005, TF2-022, p. 50.

⁷¹⁵ Transcript of 11 February 2005, TF2-022, pp. 50-51.

⁷¹⁶ Transcript of 11 February 2005, TF2-022, pp. 51-53.

⁷¹⁷ Transcript of 23 February 2005, TF2-048, p. 13.

⁷¹⁸ Transcript of 23 February 2005, TF2-048, pp. 14-15.

anything happened, a group of men speaking a Liberian language arrived and told everyone to return to their homes.⁷¹⁹

400. Around noon, a Kamajor commander ordered the civilians to leave the NDMC Headquarters. Before they could do so, another commander, angry that they were trying to leave, ordered Kamajors to shoot at the crowd.⁷²⁰ The Kamajors began shooting sporadically. The civilians dropped to the ground and remained there until the firing stopped.⁷²¹ Many were hit by stray bullets.⁷²² One man next to TF2-022 was hit by a bullet. While the man was suffering from his wound, he was approached by a Kamajor who chopped at his back with a machete, then stole his belt and hit him with it, telling him to get up. The man eventually died.⁷²³

2.3.4.4. 15 January - Outside NDMC Headquarters

401. TF2-048 left the NDMC Headquarters with her husband and elder sister after being freed.⁷²⁴ At an intersection near NDMC Headquarters, a Kamajor confiscated her elder sister's bag, which contained all of their belongings.⁷²⁵ TF2-048 then went with her family to her sister's house.⁷²⁶ At the back of the house she was approached by a Kamajor who hit her in the waist with a stick.⁷²⁷ TF2-048 turned and saw her older brother 15 yards away being held by three Kamajors who took his money and left.⁷²⁸ Another Kamajor approached her brother and showed him a list of Limbas to be killed. He told him that he had come there for him and then cut off his ear.⁷²⁹ The brother knelt down and asked the Kamajor to spare his life because he had a wife and children. The Kamajor cut his throat with a machete and then mutilated his body.⁷³⁰ TF2-048 witnessed this, but did not reveal their relationship because she knew that the Kamajors were looking for Limbas.⁷³¹

⁷¹⁹ Transcript of 23 February 2005, TF2-048, p. 15.

⁷²⁰ Transcript of 11 February 2005, TF2-022, pp. 55-56.

⁷²¹ Transcript of 11 February 2005, TF2-022, p. 56.

⁷²² Transcript of 11 February 2005, TF2-022, p. 57.

⁷²³ Transcript of 11 February 2005, TF2-022, p. 57.

⁷²⁴ Transcript of 23 February 2005, TF2-048, p. 16.

⁷²⁵ Transcript of 23 February 2005, TF2-048, pp. 16-17.

⁷²⁶ Transcript of 23 February 2005, TF2-048, p. 22.

⁷²⁷ Transcript of 23 February 2005, TF2-048, p. 22.

⁷²⁸ Transcript of 23 February 2005, TF2-048, p. 23.

⁷²⁹ Transcript of 23 February 2005, TF2-048, pp. 24-25.

⁷³⁰ Transcript of 23 February 2005, TF2-048, p. 25.

⁷³¹ Transcript of 23 February 2005, TF2-048, pp. 23-24 and 26.

402. Another group of civilians that was allowed to leave the NDMC Headquarters was escorted by Kamajors to a checkpoint where Kamajors took their bags and belongings.⁷³² After finding a photograph of a rebel in one man's bag, the Kamajors hacked him to death.⁷³³ TF2-022 knew this man to be a civilian.⁷³⁴ TF2-022 was allowed to pass and eventually came upon another checkpoint where a boy named Sule was hacked to death for carrying a wallet that resembled SLA fatigues.⁷³⁵

2.3.4.5. Burial of Corpses

403. TF2-047 was a sanitary officer in Tongo.⁷³⁶ Kamabote knew this and approached TF2-047 at the NDMC Headquarters on 14 January, telling him he would be burying a lot of corpses that day. Kamabote ordered TF2-047 to use a wheelbarrow to gather the corpses and place them in a pit at the back of the headquarters.⁷³⁷ TF2-047 buried 75 corpses on the first day of the attack and 75 more on the second day.⁷³⁸ On the second day, it was BJK Sei that ordered TF2-047 to continue burying corpses.⁷³⁹ Three days later Kamabote ordered him to help civilians bury corpses at the Methodist Primary School.⁷⁴⁰ TF2-047 then went to a place called Olumatic near Tongo and found 25 corpses of rebels. He was not able to bury the corpses because the Kamajors placed tyres on them and set them on fire.⁷⁴¹

2.3.5. Bumie and Kamboma

404. A group of civilians at the NDMC Headquarters was organised into lines to walk to Bumic.⁷⁴² Before they left the NDMC Headquarters, the Kamajors fired at the people in the lines, killing many of them.⁷⁴³ The remaining people were brought to a house in Bumie.⁷⁴⁴ The women were taken behind the house and the men were placed on the veranda in front.⁷⁴⁵ The Kamajors

⁷³² Transcript of 11 February 2005, TF2-022, pp. 58-59

⁷³³ Transcript of 11 February 2005, TF2-022, p. 59.

⁷³⁴ Transcript of 11 February 2005, TF2-022, p. 60.

⁷³⁵ Transcript of 11 February 2005, TF2-022, pp. 60-61.

⁷³⁶ Transcript of 22 February 2005, TF2-047, p. 53, p. 113.

⁷³⁷ Transcript of 22 February 2005, TF2-047, pp. 53-54, p. 59.

⁷³⁸ Transcript of 22 February 2005, TF2-047, pp. 60-62.

⁷³⁹ Transcript of 22 February 2005, TF2-047, p. 60.

⁷⁴⁰ Transcript of 22 February 2005, TF2-047, pp. 64-65.

⁷⁴¹ Transcript of 22 February 2005, TF2-047, p. 66.

⁷⁴² Transcript of 11 February 2005, TF2-015, p. 7.

⁷⁴³ Transcript of 11 February 2005, TF2-015, p. 8.

⁷⁴⁴ Transcript of 11 February 2005, TF2-015, pp. 7-8.

⁷⁴⁵ Transcript of 11 February 2005, TF2-015, pp. 8-9.

told the men to look at the sun. Five of them were pulled from the group and were shot and killed.⁷⁴⁶ Men were then selected from the remaining group to carry loads for the Kamajors.⁷⁴⁷

405. TF2-015 was among the civilians taken to Bumie. He could not carry loads for the Kamajors because he had been shot in the stomach in Tongo.⁷⁴⁸ TF2-015 tried to escape, but was caught in the bush and taken to the back of the house where he had been detained previously. He slept there that night and the next morning was taken away along the Kenema Road with a group of 14 other men and women.⁷⁴⁹

406. This group of 15 men and women was joined by other civilians along the Kenema Road. They eventually numbered 65 people.⁷⁵⁰ The civilians were attacked by Kamajors at the Kamboma Bridge and taken to a house in Kamboma Town where they were told that the Kamajors had received orders to kill anyone who passed by.⁷⁵¹ The group was separated into two lines. The Kamajors shot each person in both lines and rolled the bodies into a swamp behind the house.⁷⁵² When there were only eight civilians left, the commander of Foindu Junction, Mohamed Kaineh,⁷⁵³ arrived and told the Kamajors that it was an ambush and they should stop spoiling cartridges and use knives to kill the remaining people.⁷⁵⁴ The remaining eight people were hacked on the napes of their necks with machetes.⁷⁵⁵ TF2-015, who was the last person in the line, was hacked with a machete and rolled into the swamp on top of the other dead bodies. TF2-015 lay there for one hour before he was saved by rebels. He was the only one of the 65 civilians to survive.⁷⁵⁶

⁷⁴⁶ Transcript of 11 February 2005, TF2-015, p. 9.

⁷⁴⁷ Transcript of 11 February 2005, TF2-015, p. 10.

⁷⁴⁸ Transcript of 11 February 2005, TF2-015, p. 10.

⁷⁴⁹ Transcript of 11 February 2005, TF2-015, pp. 10-11.

⁷⁵⁰ Transcript of 11 February 2005, TF2-015, pp. 11-12.

⁷⁵¹ Transcript of 11 February 2005, TF2-015, pp. 11-12.

⁷⁵² Transcript of 11 February 2005, TF2-015, p. 13.

⁷⁵³ See transcript of 17 May 2006, Siaka Lahai, p. 44; Transcript of 04 May 2006, Arthur Koroma, p. 59; Transcript of 22 February 2006, TF2-027, p. 4. *But see also* Transcript of 19 May 2006, Mohamed Kaineh, pp. 92 and 97.

⁷⁵⁴ Transcript of 11 February 2005, TF2-015, pp. 13-14.

⁷⁵⁵ Transcript of 11 February 2005, TF2-015, p. 14.

⁷⁵⁶ Transcript of 11 February 2005, TF2-015, pp. 14-15.

2.3.6. Dodo Junction

407. TF2-144 was among a group of civilians who were led by the Kamajors from the NDMC Headquarters toward Dodo on 15 January 1998.⁷⁵⁷ In Panguma, on the way to Dodo, they were stopped by Musa Junisa's troops who checked the civilians for passes and taxes. TF2-144 witnessed Kamajors strike a woman on the back after checking her. She was carrying a child on her back. TF2-144 does not know whether she died.⁷⁵⁸ The other civilians were allowed to pass, but Kamajors would occasionally arrive and take civilians from the queue as they were walking to Dodo.⁷⁵⁹ At a checkpoint in Dodo, this same group of civilians was stopped and told to remove their passes and taxes. TF2-144 saw Kamajors hack the right hand of a man who was identified as a rebel because of the shoes that he wore.⁷⁶⁰

2.3.7. Lalehun

408. In mid-February 1998, Aruna Konowa was tied up and brought to Lalehun by Kamajors.⁷⁶¹ He was forced to sleep at the Kamajors' headquarters in Lalehun that night and the following morning the entire town was gathered at the court *barri*.⁷⁶² Chief Baimba Aruna, one of the Kamajor bosses of Lalehun, ordered Aruna Konowa to sit on the ground, denounced him as a rebel collaborator and ordered him to be killed.⁷⁶³ Kamajors took Konowa to the school compound and slit his throat with a knife and disembowelled him.⁷⁶⁴ TF2-016 was present for the meeting at the *barri* and saw the body at the school compound afterwards.⁷⁶⁵

409. Kamajors killed Brima Conteh, the Nyawa Town Speaker, a few days later.⁷⁶⁶ He was arrested by Kamajors from Lalehun at a meeting of the chiefs held by BJK Sei in Tongo.⁷⁶⁷ Brima Conteh was stripped naked and taken to Lalehun, with a cement block on his head and a rope

⁷⁵⁷ Transcript of 24 February 2005, TF2-144, p. 66.

⁷⁵⁸ Transcript of 24 February 2005, TF2-144, pp. 67-68.

⁷⁵⁹ Transcript of 24 February 2005, TF2-144, p. 68.

⁷⁶⁰ Transcript of 24 February 2005, TF2-144, pp. 69-70.

⁷⁶¹ Transcript of 01 March 2005, TF2-016, pp. 33 and 35.

⁷⁶² Transcript of 01 March 2005, TF2-016, p. 36.

⁷⁶³ Transcript of 01 March 2005, TF2-016, pp. 36-38.

⁷⁶⁴ Transcript of 01 March 2005, TF2-016, pp. 38-39.

⁷⁶⁵ Transcript of 01 March 2005, TF2-016, p. 39.

⁷⁶⁶ Transcript of 01 March 2005, TF2-016, p. 39.

⁷⁶⁷ Transcript of 01 March 2005, TF2-016, pp. 39-40; Transcript of 24 February 2005, TF2-013, pp. 18-19.

around his neck. He was paraded around town in this condition.⁷⁶⁸ Baimba Aruna denounced Brima Conteh as the chief of the rebels and ordered his death.⁷⁶⁹ Kamajors took Brima Conteh to a banana plantation and slit open his throat and stomach.⁷⁷⁰ Two Kamajors ate the insides of his stomach.⁷⁷¹ The Kamajors severed Brima Conteh's head and left his body in the plantation. A Kamajor was ordered to proceed to town with Brima Conteh's head for a celebration.⁷⁷² Another Kamajor named Vandi took Conteh's intestines to town in a five gallon container.⁷⁷³ The Kamajors proceeded from house to house with his head and intestines; eventually they were left at Baimba Aruna's house.⁷⁷⁴

410. From mid-February to at least mid-March, Kamajors looted in Lalehun: they took doors, roofs and zinc from houses. They also burnt nine houses, including TF2-016's father's house.⁷⁷⁵ Kamajors were told to take what they wanted.⁷⁷⁶ There was an organized operation whereby the town was divided into different areas and civilians were woken every morning at 6:00am to gather at the town *barri*, where they were ordered to carry loads for the Kamajors. If the civilians refused, they would be threatened or kept in the guard room.⁷⁷⁷

2.4. Koribondo

2.4.1. Background to Koribondo

411. Koribondo is situated at the intersection of the roads running from Bo to Pujehun and from Mattru to Kenema. Koribondo is in Jaiama-Bongor Chiefdom, which is the chiefdom where Norman became Regent Chief in October 1994.⁷⁷⁸ It is an amalgamated chiefdom: Koribondo was part of Jaiama Section and Telu was part of Bongor. There was animosity between the inhabitants of these two sections; this was exacerbated by the decision of Chief Norman to reside in Telu.⁷⁷⁹

⁷⁶⁸ Transcript of 01 March 2005, TF2-016, p. 40, Transcript of 24 February 2005, TF2-013, pp. 19-20.

⁷⁶⁹ Transcript of 24 February 2005, TF2-013, pp. 20-21.

⁷⁷⁰ Transcript of 01 March 2005, TF2-016, pp. 40-41; Transcript of 24 February 2005, TF2-013, pp. 22-23.

⁷⁷¹ Transcript of 01 March 2005, TF2-016, p. 41.

⁷⁷² Transcript of 01 March 2005, TF2-016, p. 43; Transcript of 24 February 2005, TF2-013, pp. 24-25.

⁷⁷³ Transcript of 24 February 2005, TF2-013, p. 28.

⁷⁷⁴ Transcript of 24 February 2005, TF2-013, p. 29.

⁷⁷⁵ Transcript of 01 March 2006, TF2-016, pp. 32-34.

⁷⁷⁶ Transcript of 01 March 2006, TF2-016, p. 44.

⁷⁷⁷ Transcript of 01 March 2006, TF2-016, p. 44.

⁷⁷⁸ Transcript of 30 January 2006, Norman, pp. 43-44.

⁷⁷⁹ Transcript of 30 January 2006, Norman, pp. 43-44.

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The inhabitants of Jaiama saw the war as an opportunity to end the amalgamation. The military was quick to notice this strain between Jaiama and Bongor and it decided to establish a base at Koribondo in order to pre-empt any potential arrangement between authorities in Jaiama and the RUF.⁷⁸⁰

412. Since 1991, Koribondo had been the headquarters of the 34th Battalion of the SLA.⁷⁸¹ It served as a company-sized military base until 1997.⁷⁸² There were no barracks in Koribondo town so the soldiers and civilians were forced to live together.⁷⁸³ This resulted in a number of marriages between soldiers and civilians.⁷⁸⁴

413. In his capacity as Regent Chief, Norman held numerous meetings with commanders and elders in Koribondo. During these meetings, it was decided that the inhabitants of Jaiama-Bongor Chiefdom should provide men to be trained as vigilantes. These vigilantes were subsequently provided with military uniforms. This was not considered unusual since during the reign of the NPRC Government⁷⁸⁵ both vigilantes and soldiers were issued the same uniform. During the reign of the AFRC, the vigilantes were more loyal to the soldiers than to the hunters⁷⁸⁶ or ECOMOG.⁷⁸⁷

414. In 1996, Norman, in his capacity as Regent Chief, invited the Kamajors to Koribondo to assist the soldiers in fighting the rebels.⁷⁸⁸ While in Koribondo, the Kamajors and soldiers dressed differently: Kamajors wore a special kind of dress called *ronko* which was made of country cloth. The *ronkos* were covered in cowrie shells and had short sleeves. By contrast, the soldiers wore khaki government uniforms.⁷⁸⁹

⁷⁸⁰ Transcript of 30 January 2006, Norman, pp. 43-44.

⁷⁸¹ Transcript of 15 June 2004, TF2-198, p. 48.

⁷⁸² Transcript of 31 January 2006, Norman, p. 8; Transcript of 30 January 2006, Norman, p. 46.

⁷⁸³ Transcript of 15 June 2004, TF2-198, p. 48.

⁷⁸⁴ Transcript of 30 January 2006, Norman p. 47; Transcript of 15 June 2004, TF2-198, p. 15.

⁷⁸⁵ The NPRC Government ruled from 29 April 1992 to 29 March 1996.

⁷⁸⁶ Hunters were trained by ECOMOG under the Director of training Chief Police Officer, M.S. Dumbuya.

⁷⁸⁷ Transcript of 30 January 2006, Norman, p. 46; Transcript of 30th January 2006, Norman, p. 48.

⁷⁸⁸ Transcript of 15 June 2004, TF2-198, pp. 15-16.

⁷⁸⁹ Transcript of 15 June 2004, TF2-198, pp. 15-16; Transcript of 22 June 2004, TF2-012, p. 30.

415. Initially, the arrival of the Kamajors in Koribondo was welcomed by the soldiers and both lived happily together. However, before the soldiers left Koribondo in 1997, the relationship had soured⁷⁹⁰ due to the overthrow of President Kabbah's government by soldiers on 25 May 1997.⁷⁹¹

416. Before the Coup, Koribondo and its surrounding villages were controlled by rebels. The RUF and AFRC had a battalion stationed at Koribondo. For this reason, the Kamajors wanted to capture Koribondo and flush out the AFRC and RUF rebels from Koribondo.⁷⁹² After the Coup, arrangements were put in place at Base Zero for the RUF and AFRC military unit in Koribondo to be captured. The capture and control of Koribondo was expected to facilitate the movement of ECOMOG troops from Pujehun to Bo.⁷⁹³

2.4.2. Attacks on Koribondo by Kamajors

417. Between 1997 and 1998, Kamajors armed with RPGs attacked Koribondo on numerous occasions. One attack, a skirmish between hunters and soldiers, occurred between July and September 1997.⁷⁹⁴ A subsequent attack took place between September and October 1997.⁷⁹⁵ In both attacks, soldiers repelled the Kamajors.⁷⁹⁶ While some of these attacks were coordinated from Base Zero, others were planned locally.⁷⁹⁷

2.4.3. Local Planning at Kpetewoma

418. As found in section V.2.2.10.4 above Norman gave an order at Base Zero to attack Koribondo, following which the local planning for the attack was done at Kpetewoma. Albert J Nallo was the intermediary between Norman at Base Zero and Joe Tamidey.⁷⁹⁸ There were three meetings; the first and third were operational planning meetings. During the first meeting, local

⁷⁹⁰ Transcript of 15 June 2004, TF2-198, p. 45.

⁷⁹¹ Transcript of 15 June 2004, TF2-198, p. 17.

⁷⁹² Transcript of 16 September 2004, TF2-082, pp. 136-137; Transcript of 30 January 2006, Norman, pp. 48-49; Transcript of 5 November 2004, TF2-201, p. 101 (CS).

⁷⁹³ Transcript of 30 January 2006, Norman, pp. 48-49.

⁷⁹⁴ Transcript of 30 January 2006, Norman, p. 45.

⁷⁹⁵ Transcript of 30 January 2006, Norman, pp. 54-55.

⁷⁹⁶ Transcript of TF2-157, 16 June 2004, p. 34; Transcript of TF2-198, 15 June 2004, p. 17; Transcript 15 May 2006, Haroun Collier, p. 9.

⁷⁹⁷ Transcript of 10 February 2005, Bobor Tucker, pp. 43-44; Transcript of 16 November 2004, TF2-008, p. 78; Transcript of 8 June 2005, TF2-011, p. 28, (CS); Transcript of 2 November 2004, p. 62; Transcript of 15 May 2006, Haroun Collier, p. 8; Transcript of 15 September 2004, TF2-082, pp.14-15 and 17, Transcript of 10 February 2005, Bob Tucker, pp. 47-48, Transcript of 8 May 2006, Dixon Kosia, pp. 52-53.

⁷⁹⁸ Transcript of 15 September 2004, pp. 17-19 (CS); Transcript of 10 February 2005, Bobor Tucker, p. 47.

manpower was provided to assist the Kamajors.⁷⁹⁹ At the third meeting, Nallo, on behalf of Norman, supplied cartridges, bombs, G3s and AK-47s to Joe Tamidey. Nallo informed Joe Tamidey that Norman had asked him to bring the armunitions to Joe Tamidey for the attack on Koribondo.⁸⁰⁰

419. Upon receiving the ammunicions, plans were made, fighters were organized and the arms and ammunition supplied by Nallo were distributed to the various groups by Joe Tamidey.⁸⁰¹ The Kamajors also agreed on the commanders to lead the battle: Bobor Tucker, Joe Tamidey and Lahai George. Bobor Tucker was responsible for the Bo-Koribondo Highway, Lahai George was to attack from the Sumbuya-Koribondo Highway, and Joe Tamidey was to enter Koribondo through Blama.⁸⁰² After these strategic arrangements were made, Joe Tamidey informed Nallo so that he could report to Norman on the imminent attack of Koribondo, planned for 13 February 1998.⁸⁰³

2.4.4. Final Attack and Capture of Koribondo by Kamajors

420. Around 700 Kamajors attacked Koribondo on Friday, 13 February 1998 at about 1:30pm. The attack lasted for about 45 minutes.⁸⁰⁴ The attack started from Jombohun and was commanded by Joe Tamidey, Bobor Tucker, a.k.a. Jegbeyama and Lamin Ngobeh. Although the commanders were operating with different groups, they were all under Albert J Nallo's command.⁸⁰⁵ The Kamajors that participated in the attack on Koribondo were predominantly, but not exclusively,

⁷⁹⁹ Transcript of 15 September 2004, pp. 14-15 and 17 (CS); Transcript of 10 February 2005, Bobor Tucker, pp. 47-48; Transcript of 8 May 2006, Dixon Kosia, pp. 52-53.

⁸⁰⁰ Transcript of 15 September 2004, pp. 17-19 (CS); Transcript of 10 February 2005, Bobor Tucker, p. 47.

⁸⁰¹ Transcript of 15 September 2004, pp. 14-15 and 17 (CS); Transcript of 10 February 2005, Bobor Tucker, pp. 47-48; Transcript of 8 May 2006, Dixon Kosia, pp. 52-53.

⁸⁰² Transcript of 10 February 2005, Bobor Tucker, pp. 48-49; Transcript of 8 May 2006, Dixon Kosia, p. 53.

⁸⁰³ Transcript of 15 September 2004, p. 17 (CS).

⁸⁰⁴ Transcript of 15 June 2004, TF2-198, pp. 18-19; Transcript of 16 June 2004, TF2-157, p. 9; Transcript of 10 February 2005, Bobor Tucker, p. 49; Transcript of 8 September 2004, TF2-162, p. 12; Transcript of 15 September 2004, TF2-082, p. 25 (CS); Transcript of 21 June 2004, TF2-012, p. 23; Transcript of 17 June 2004, TF2-176; pp. 75-76; Transcript of 6 October 2006, Brima Tarawally, p. 53; Transcript of 8 May 2006, Dixon Kosia, p. 52; Transcript of 8 May 2006, Dauda Sheriff, p. 95.

⁸⁰⁵ Transcript of 14 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, p. 44; Transcript of 4 November 2004, TF2-201, p. 115; Transcript of 2 November 2004, TF2-021, p. 62.

from the Jaiama-Bongor Chiefdom.⁸⁰⁶ Others came from Pujehun District, Bonthe District and Bo District.⁸⁰⁷ This attack led to the capture of Koribondo.⁸⁰⁸

2.4.5. Crimes Committed by Kamajors in Koribondo

2.4.5.1. Unlawful Killings, Terrorizing Civilian Population and Collective Punishment

421. On Sunday, 15 February 1998⁸⁰⁹ at 9:30am, Kamajors arrested five Limba civilians named Sofiania, Sarrah, Momoh, Kamara and Koroma at the Koribondo junction. They were accused of being junta members responsible for killing Kamajors. While they were beaten, wounded and mutilated, the Kamajors sang the usual Kamajor song which precedes a killing.⁸¹⁰ Two of the civilians were shot and the other three were cut on the back of their necks with a cutlass, all five died from their wounds.⁸¹¹ Sarrah and Momoh were beheaded and their heads were displayed at the junction; one was turned towards Blama Road and the other towards Sumbuya Road.⁸¹²

422. On the same day, Kamajors mutilated and killed two Limba civilians: Sarah Binkolo and Sarah Lamina. Both of them were killed by the bridge along Blama Road in Koribondo. The Kamajors sang a Kamajor song while mutilating these women.⁸¹³

423. On Monday, 16 February 1998, Kamajors killed eight people along Blama Road in Koribondo. The victims were five men belonging to the junta and three women who were the wives of soldiers. The women's names were Amie, Jainaba and Esther. These eight people were arrested, beaten and mutilated.⁸¹⁴ Two of the women were killed by having sticks inserted through their genitals until they came out through the women's mouths.⁸¹⁵ The third was killed with a

⁸⁰⁶ Transcript of 4 November 2004, TF2-201, p. 115 (CS); Transcript of 15 September 2004, TF2-082, p. 26; Transcript of 10 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, p. 75; Transcript of 15 June 2004, TF2-198, p. 58.

⁸⁰⁷ Transcript of 10 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, p. 75.

⁸⁰⁸ Transcript of 10 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, p. 81; Transcript of 16 June 2004, TF2-157, p. 4-5; Transcript of 15 June 2004, TF2-198, p. 60; Transcript of 30 January 2006, Norman, p. 43; Transcript of 15 June 2004, TF2-198, p. 49.

⁸⁰⁹ Transcript of 9 September 2004, TF2-159, pp. 27-29; Transcript of 14 September 2004, TF2-140, p. 73.

⁸¹⁰ Transcript of 9 September 2004, TF2-159, p. 29; Transcript of 9 September 2004, TF2-159, p. 28; Transcript of 14 September 2004, TF2-140, p. 73.

⁸¹¹ Transcript of 9 September 2004, TF2-159, pp. 30-31.

⁸¹² Transcript of 9 September 2004, TF2-159, pp. 31-32.

⁸¹³ Transcript of 16 June 2004, TF2-157, pp. 14-15; Transcript of 15 June 2004, TF2-198, p. 33.

⁸¹⁴ Transcript of 9 September 2004, TF2-159, pp. 35-36, 38 and 99.

⁸¹⁵ Transcript of 9 September 2004, TF2-159, p. 37.

cutlass.⁸¹⁶ Four of the men were shot and the fifth was cut on the back of his neck with a cutlass; all five died from their wounds.⁸¹⁷

424. The Kamajors disembowelled the women and put their entrails in a bucket. The women's stomachs were also removed. Their guts were made into checkpoints so that anyone coming past could see them.⁸¹⁸ Part of their entrails were eaten and their bodies were buried.⁸¹⁹

425. On the same day, Kamajors killed Chief Kafala.⁸²⁰ Chief Kafala had been accused of being a junta member who was leading soldiers. He was brought from Bendu to Koribondo in the presence of many people. Chief Kafala' was decapitated and his body was mutilated in the street opposite the hospital. This was done in the presence of four civilians. Kamajors took Chief Kafala to the swamp where a Kamajor further mutilated him on the upper right shoulder and then forced him into a small hole with a shovel. Chief Kafala's feet were amputated and he was shot twice. The Kamajors ordered the civilians present to cover him with mud; two of them did so while the Kamajors sang.⁸²¹

2.4.5.2. Flogging Resulting in the Death of Lahai Bassie

426. After the capture of Koribondo, an elderly person named Lahai Bassie was arrested and beaten severely by Kamajors because his son was a soldier. The Kamajors found a picture of his son and also a letter from his son in his house.⁸²² Lahai Bassie died one week after the serious beatings he suffered at the hands of Kamajors.⁸²³

2.4.5.3. Burning of Houses

427. Bombs were launched during the Kamajor attack on Koribondo on 13 February 1998; as a result some houses were destroyed or burnt.⁸²⁴ The nine-room house of TF2-032 was partially

⁸¹⁶ Transcript of 9 September 2004, TF2-159, pp. 37-38.

⁸¹⁷ Transcript of 9 September 2004, TF2-159, p. 37.

⁸¹⁸ Transcript of 9 September 2004, TF2-159, pp. 38-39.

⁸¹⁹ Transcript of 9 September 2004, TF2-159, p. 39.

⁸²⁰ Transcript of 16 June 2004, TF2-157, p. 16; Transcript of 13 September 2004, TF2-032, p. 25 (CS); Transcript of 15 June 2004, TF2-198, p. 33.

⁸²¹ Transcript of 16 June 2004, TF2-157, pp. 16-17.

⁸²² Transcript of 16 June 2006, TF2-157, p. 18.

⁸²³ Transcript of 16 June 2006, TF2-157, p. 19.

⁸²⁴ Transcript of 16 June 2004, TF2-157, p. 14; Transcript of 17 June 2004, TF2-157, p. 37; Transcript of 14 September 2004, TF2-140, p. 82, Transcript of 21 June 2004, TF2-012, p. 24; Transcript of 15 June 2004, TF2-198, pp. 32 and 49.

destroyed.⁸²⁵ The consequences of this continue to upset TF2-032 as since the destruction of his home, his children are scattered and, despite his advanced age, he now sleeps in a kitchen.⁸²⁶

428. Between 13 and 15 February 1998,⁸²⁷ after the capture of Koribondo, Kamajors went on a rampage in Koribondo and burnt down 25 houses. Dry grass was used to set the houses ablaze.⁸²⁸ Houses belonging to Daniel Habib, Saidu Bah, Pa Musa and others were burnt.⁸²⁹ Some of those whose houses were burnt were discouraged; others feared for their lives.⁸³⁰

429. Albert J Nallo burnt the compound of Shekou Gbao; he had been ordered to do so by Norman at a private meeting at Base Zero. Albert J Nallo had also been ordered to kill Shekou Gbao but could not find him.⁸³¹ Albert J Nallo also burnt the house of Father Mike Lamin⁸³² and the compound of Mr. Biyo on the order of Norman.⁸³³

2.4.5.4. Looting in Koribondo

430. After the capture of Koribondo, the Kamajors looted property from houses, including videos, tape-recorders, money and generators.⁸³⁴ Kamajors took about 20 bushels of rice from TF2-162 and also confiscated his household property.⁸³⁵ Bob Tucker looted fifty-six bundles of eight-foot zinc.⁸³⁶ Most of the looted properties were taken at Jimmi Highway on Jimmi Road.⁸³⁷

2.4.5.5. Captured Enemy Combatants

431. Following the attack on Koribondo, soldiers and their relatives, who were arrested or captured or who surrendered, were detained for a short period of time. They were later transferred

⁸²⁵ Transcript of 13 September 2004, TF2-032, p. 33; Transcript of 17 June 2004, TF2-157, p. 37.

⁸²⁶ Transcript of 13 September 2004, TF2-032, p. 29.

⁸²⁷ Transcript of 9 September 2004, TF2-159, p. 26; Transcript of 10 February 2005, Bob Tucker, p. 51; Transcript of 17 June 2004, TF2-176, p. 80; Transcript of 21 June 2004, TF2-012, p. 24; Transcript of 13 September 2004, TF2-032, p. 52; Transcript of 14 September 2004, TF2-140, p. 82; Transcript of 5 November 2004, TF2-201, p. 54 (CS).

⁸²⁸ Transcript of 9 September 2004, TF2-159, p. 26; Transcript of 10 February 2005, Bob Tucker, p. 51; Transcript of 17 June 2004, TF2-176, p. 80; Transcript of 21 June 2004, TF2-012, p. 24; Transcript of 13 September 2004, TF2-032, p. 52; Transcript of 14 September 2004, TF2-140, p. 82; Transcript of 5 November 2004, TF2-201, p. 54 (CS).

⁸²⁹ Transcript of 9 September 2004, TF2-159, pp. 26-27; Transcript of 21 June 2004, TF2-176, p. 80; Transcript of 13 September 2004, pp. 34-35.

⁸³⁰ Transcript of 17 June 2004, TF2-176, p. 81; Transcript of 9 September 2004, TF2-159, p. 27.

⁸³¹ Transcript of 10 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, p. 79.

⁸³² Transcript of 10 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, p. 79.

⁸³³ Transcript of 10 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, p. 79.

⁸³⁴ Transcript of 14 September 2004, TF2-140, p. 82.

⁸³⁵ Transcript of 8 September 2004, TF2-162, p. 21.

⁸³⁶ Transcript of 10 February 2005, Bobor Tucker, p. 50.

⁸³⁷ Transcript of 14 September 2004, TF2-140; p. 82.

to ECOMOG⁸³⁸ except for one soldier, Sergeant Kamanda, who was sent to Norman at Baze Zero to prove that the Kamajors had captured soldiers.⁸³⁹

2.4.6. Meeting after the Capture of Koribondo

2.4.6.1. Private Meeting between Joe Tamidey and the two Accused

432. Four days after the capture of Bo, around 21 February 1998, Joe Tamidey met with Fofana, Kondewa and Norman in Koribondo. He was taken to Bo where he was questioned by Fofana, as to his reasons for not killing Sheku Gbao.⁸⁴⁰

2.4.6.2. Meetings at the Court *Barri* in Koribondo

433. Norman attended two meetings in Koribondo after its capture.⁸⁴¹

2.4.6.2.1. *First Meeting at the Koribondo Court Barri*

434. During the first meeting, at the end of March 1998, Norman addressed the people of Koribondo at the court *barri*. Approximately about 200 civilians and 400 Kamajors were present.⁸⁴²

Norman stated:

Hey, Kamajors, I thank you very much, but you people have not done my work which I told you to do. You have not done my work at all. Fellows, what did I tell you to do? That inside Koribondo I only want three houses, only three houses in Koribondo here. Oh, look at all these houses. I told you that I wanted the mosque, the court *barri* and one house where I would have to reside, but look at all this crowd that I am seeing here. You people are afraid of killing. Why? The soldiers killed, nothing happened; Kapras killed, nothing happened; rebels killed, nothing happened. Why are you afraid of killing? Why? Really, you've not done my work, you've disappointed me.⁸⁴³

⁸³⁸ Transcript of 10 March 2005, TF2-014, p. 76; Transcript of 15 September 2004, TF2-082, p. 47; Transcript of 16 September 2004, TF2-082, pp. 138-139; Transcript of 11 May 2006, Joe Nunie, pp. 35-36; Transcript of 8 May 2006, Dauda Sheriff, pp. 97-98; Transcript of 8 May 2006, Dixon Kosia, p. 80.

⁸³⁹ Transcript of 15 September 2004, TF2-082, pp.37-38, Transcript of 7 February 2006, Norman, p. 54; See Section on "Crimes Committed in Talia".

⁸⁴⁰ Transcript of 15 September 2004, pp. 40-42 (CS).

⁸⁴¹ Transcript of 30 January 2006, Norman, p. 71; Transcript of 15 June 2004, TF2-198, p. 45.

⁸⁴² Transcript of 16 June 2004, TF2-157, p. 20, Transcript of 8 May 2006, Dauda Sheriff, p. 99; Transcript of 15 September 2004, TF2-082, p. 48 (CS); Transcript of 15 June 2004, TF2-198, p. 37.

⁸⁴³ Transcript of 15 June 2004, TF2-198, p. 37; Transcript of 16 June 2004, TF2-157, p. 20-21; Transcript of 15 September 2004, TF2-082, p. 49 (CS); Transcript of 21 June 2004, TF2-012, p. 27; Transcript of 16 June 2004, TF2-157, pp. 20-21; Transcript of 9 September 2004, TF2-159, p. 54; Transcript of 13 September 2004, TF2-032, p. 62, Transcript of 9 September 2004, TF2-162, p. 30; Transcript of 15 September 2004, TF2-082, p. 49.

435. During this visit, Norman was accompanied by Fofana and Kondewa; however, they did not attend the meeting at the court *barri* in Koribondo.⁸⁴⁴

2.4.6.2.2. *Second Meeting at the Koribondo Court Barri*

436. Norman attended a second meeting at the court *barri* in Koribondo in April 1998.⁸⁴⁵ At this meeting Norman stated:

Oh Koribondo people bless God. He said the Kamajors did not do what I told them to do. He said, we should stop slaying people's children. All this destruction that the Kamajors did, he says, you have to - and they swore at me because I asked them to do it. You know, stop blaming them. Stop blaming them, anything that the Kamajors did here I commanded them to do it.⁸⁴⁶

437. There is no evidence that either Fofana or Kondewa attended the second meeting at the court *barri* in Koribondo.⁸⁴⁷

2.5. Bo District

2.5.1. Background to the conflict in Bo

438. Before the overthrow of President Kabbah's government, the police were in charge of security in Bo. The military was supported by the SSD, the armed wing of the police.⁸⁴⁸ The initial arrival of soldiers in Bo was in 1992.⁸⁴⁹ In the early stages of the conflict the police were duty-bound to support the soldiers.⁸⁵⁰

⁸⁴⁴ Transcript of 15 September 2004, TF2-082, p. 49; Transcript of 16 September 2004, TF2-082, p. 146 (CS).

⁸⁴⁵ Transcript of 15 June 2004, TF2-198, p. 60; Transcript of 9 September 2004, TF2-159, p. 55; Transcript of 7 February 2006, Norman, p. 32; Transcript of 15 September 2004, TF2-082, p. 49; Transcript of 16 June, 2004, TF2-157, p. 21; Transcript of 13 September 2004, TF2-032, p. 62; Transcript of 9 September 2004, TF2-162, p. 3.

⁸⁴⁶ Transcript of 15 June 2004, TF2-198, p. 38; Transcript of 15 September 2004, TF2-082, pp. 49 and 50; Transcript of 16 June, 2004, TF2-157, pp. 21-22; Transcript of 13 September 2004, TF2-032, p. 63; Transcript of 9 September 2005, TF2-159, p. 56.

⁸⁴⁷ Transcript of 16 September 2004, TF2-082, p. 147(CS).

⁸⁴⁸ Transcript of 15 February 2005, TF2-001, p. 15.

⁸⁴⁹ Transcript of 15 February 2005, TF2-001, p. 39.

⁸⁵⁰ Transcript of 15 February 2005, TF2-001, p. 17.





439. The police initially supported the juntas following the Coup. During this period, the police in Bo were given rifles to save lives and property as well as to defend themselves in case of attacks at night.⁸⁵¹ The police ceased to support the juntas in late 1997.⁸⁵²

440. After the coup, the Kamajors left Bo. The police had tried to create a cordial relationship with the Kamajors; however, the Kamajors turned against the police because of their alleged collaboration with the juntas.⁸⁵³

441. On 14 February 1998 the soldiers left Bo and immediately thereafter the youth, popularly called vigilantes, took control of Bo for one day before the arrival of the Kamajors on 15 February 1998.⁸⁵⁴ During this time, the youth killed and burned collaborators and burned their houses.⁸⁵⁵

2.5.2. Attack on Kebi Town / Local Planning for the Attack on Bo

442. Kebi Town in Bo District was of importance in the Bo campaign because it was the location of the junta's Brigade Headquarters.⁸⁵⁶ After receiving orders from Norman to attack Kebi Town and Bo at Base Zero, as found by the Chamber in Section V.2.2.10.5, TF2-017 went with Kamajors to Bumpeh.⁸⁵⁷ The tactical planning for the Bo attack was done in Bumpeh which was considered by Norman as the focal point for the eventual attack and capture of Bo.⁸⁵⁸ Albert J Nallo knew of the local planning in Bumpeh.⁸⁵⁹

⁸⁵¹ TF2-119 also testified that after the coup, the security situation in Bo was intense, crime rate was high and there was a public outcry for the police to provide security within the township. Amidst this, the police were facing harassment and suppression. Transcript of 24 November 2004, TF2-119, pp. 21-26.

⁸⁵² Transcript of 15 February 2005, TF2-001, pp. 17-18.

⁸⁵³ Transcript of 24 November 2004, TF2-119, p. 11.

⁸⁵⁴ Transcript of 25 November 2004, TF2-156, pp. 34-36: The youths carried cutlasses and sticks, they fought against the juntas to protect and defend their community they even had checkpoint prior to the arrival of the Kamajors: Transcript of 25 November 2004, TF2-156, pp. 83-84, Transcript of 27 September 2006, Morris Ngobeh, pp. 7, 9, 12.

⁸⁵⁵ Transcript of 27 September 2006, Morris Ngobeh, pp. 5-6, 12-13, 17-19.

⁸⁵⁶ Transcript of 19 November 2004, TF2-017, p. 95 (CS)

⁸⁵⁷ Transcript of 19 November 2004, TF2-017, p. 95 (CS); Moses Bangura testified that the Kamajors were to attack the Rebels at the Bo Brigade in order to get arms. Transcript of 17 October 2006, Moses Bangura, pp. 12-13.

⁸⁵⁸ Transcript of 22 November 2004, TF2-017, p. 1-3 (CS); Bobor Tucker testified that after the capture of Koribondo on 13th February 1998, he went to Bo because he heard that the Kamajors had captured Bo and Bo was under their control. Transcript of 10 February 2005, Bobor Tucker, pp. 52-53.

⁸⁵⁹ Transcript of 14 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, pp. 23-24.

443. Before the attack on Bo in February 1998, an attack on Kebi Town was launched in early January 1998. It was led by Battalion commander James Kaillie who was the commander at Bumpah and his Deputy was Joseph Lappia.⁸⁶⁰

444. Kebi Town was captured and the Kamajors proceeded to Dar-es-Salaam, Bumpah Chiefdom, where TF2-017 gave a verbal situation report on the Kebi attack. As proof that they had launched the attack on Kebi Town, TF2-017 handed a captured soldier and solar panels from the communication centre in the Kebi Town Headquarters to Norman, in the presence of Fofana, Kondewa and several other Kamajors.⁸⁶¹ Norman handed over the captured soldier to Kondewa who took him to Base Zero.⁸⁶²

445. The order to attack Bo in February 1998 was reiterated to TF2-017 in Bumpah by Norman in the presence of Fofana and Kondewa.⁸⁶³ At Bumpah, Kondewa renewed the initiation of certain Kamajors, to prepare them to attack Bo. These Kamajors took ammunition from Bumpah as they regrouped with the re-initiated Kamajors and went to attack Bo.⁸⁶⁴

446. Norman met with Nallo before the Koribondo and Bo attacks at Base Zero and gave him specific instructions for these two attacks, while Fofana was present.⁸⁶⁵ Norman gave specific orders to Nallo to kill certain identified civilians in Bo who were labelled as "collaborators", loot and burn their houses, loot the Southern Pharmacy and bring the medicines to Norman. Specifically the name of MB Sesay was mentioned.⁸⁶⁶ Norman also ordered Nallo to kill the police officers.⁸⁶⁷

447. The attack on Bo proceeded from four flanks.⁸⁶⁸ Nallo, in his capacity as the Regional Director of Operations, was regarded by TF2-017 as his "operational" or "division" Commander for the Bo attacks.⁸⁶⁹ TF2-017's group was based at Tikonko Road.⁸⁷⁰ James Kaillie was the

⁸⁶⁰ Transcript of 19 November 2004, TF2-017, pp. 94-95 (CS).

⁸⁶¹ Transcript of 19 November 2004, TF2-017, pp. 98-99 (CS).

⁸⁶² Transcript of 19 November 2004, TF2-017, pp. 98-99 (CS).

⁸⁶³ Transcript of 19 November 2004, TF2-017, pp. 100-101 (CS).

⁸⁶⁴ Transcript of 19 November 2004, TF2-017, pp. 110-111 (CS).

⁸⁶⁵ Transcript of 10 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, pp. 70-77; Transcript of 11 May 2006, DW Joe Nunie, pp. 92-93.

⁸⁶⁶ Transcript of 10 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, pp. 70-77; Transcript of 8 June 2005, TF2-011, pp. 29-30; Transcript of 22 November 2004, TF2-017, pp. 91-94.

⁸⁶⁷ Transcript of 10 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, pp. 75-76; Transcript of 15 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, pp. 55-56.

⁸⁶⁸ Transcript of 22 November 2004, TF2-017, pp. 2-3 (CS).

⁸⁶⁹ Transcript of 22 November 2004, TF2-017, p. 2 (CS).

⁸⁷⁰ Transcript of 22 November 2004, TF2-017, pp. 4-7 (CS).

Battalion Commander of this group from Tikonko Road (Matru) and Joseph Lappia was his Deputy Battalion Commander.⁸⁷¹ TF2-017 was part of this group and with his 38 Kapras and 270 Kamajors, he participated in the attack.⁸⁷²

448. In addition to James Kaillic's group, there were other groups of Kamajors involved in the attack on Bo. The Kamajors attacked Bo from the direction of Gerihun, Dambara, the Bo-Moyamba Highway and the Matru-Bo Highway.⁸⁷³ The groups from Gerihun, Dambara and the Bo-Moyamba Highway were all instructed to enter Bo and to wait at a particular area.⁸⁷⁴

2.5.3. Kamajors enter Bo Town on 15 February 1998

449. On 15 February 1998, TF2-017 and his group of Kamajors did not meet resistance when they entered Bo Town.⁸⁷⁵ There were young boys among the Kamajors.⁸⁷⁶ On the morning of their arrival in Bo, there were no forces fighting in Bo.⁸⁷⁷ The juntas had pulled out of Bo early in the morning Saturday, 14 February 1998.⁸⁷⁸

2.5.3.1. Crimes Committed Against Policemen by Kamajors on Arrival in Bo

2.5.3.1.1. Kamajors at the Police Barracks

450. On 15 February 1998, approximately 2000 Kamajors entered Bo from the direction of Kenema. They were carrying AK-47 guns, RPG bombs, machetes, catapults and sticks with nails attached to them.⁸⁷⁹

⁸⁷¹ Transcript of 22 November 2004, TF2-017, pp. 4-5 (CS).

⁸⁷² Transcript of 19 November 2004, TF2-017, p. 97 (CS).

⁸⁷³ Transcript of 22 November 2004, TF2-017, p. 1-3 (CS); Bobor Tucker testified that after the capture of Koribondo on 13 February 1998, he went to Bo because he heard that the Kamajors had captured Bo and Bo was under their control. Transcript of 10 February 2005, Bobor Tucker, pp. 52-53.

⁸⁷⁴ Transcript of 22 November 2004, TF2-017, pp. 3-4 (CS).

⁸⁷⁵ Transcript of 22 November 2004, TF2-017, p. 5 (CS); Transcript of 27 September 2006, Morries Ngobeh, p. 13, Transcript of 25 November 2006, TF2-030, p. 3.

⁸⁷⁶ Transcript of 9 February 2005, TF2-006, pp. 16-17.

⁸⁷⁷ Transcript of 25 November 2004, TF2-030, p. 4.

⁸⁷⁸ Transcript of 23 November 2004, TF2-119, pp. 103-104; Numerous witnesses testify that they were able to identify the Kamajors by their uniform, which was commonly known as ronkos, with various items like shells, glasses; cowries were tied to the ronkos like a talisman; Transcript of 23 November 2004, TF2-119, p. 105; Transcript of 29 November 2004, TF2-057, pp. 110-111; Transcript of 9 February 2005, TF2-006, p. 9; Transcript of 25 November 2006, TF2-030, p. 4.

⁸⁷⁹ Transcript of 14 February 2005, TF2-001, pp. 70-75.

451. While the Kamajors were in Bo they captured and killed police officers.⁸⁸⁰ Those that were missing had been killed; they were not missing in action. The police that had been killed did not have ammunition.⁸⁸¹

452. On 15 February 1998, Kamajors killed eight police men at the new police barracks; TF2-056 saw the corpses.⁸⁸²

2.5.3.1.2. *Beating of OC Bundu, OC Katta and OC Ndanema*

453. On 15 February 1998, Kamajors under the leadership of Nallo, Agbamu Murray and John Ngombah beat OC Bundu (the SSD boss) at the Bo police station. OC Bundu was then forcefully taken to his house in which Kamajors searched for ammunition. The Kamajors took the ammunition that they found at OC Bundu's house and returned to the police station.⁸⁸³ Later on the same day, TF2-001 witnessed another group of Kamajors capture OC Bundu, OC Ndanema and OC Katta at gunpoint and beat them; OC Katta was beaten particularly harshly and he cried.⁸⁸⁴ TF2-001 feared for his own life.⁸⁸⁵

2.5.3.1.3. *Mistreatment of TF2-001 and Looting of his Property*

454. After witnessing this incident, TF2-001 returned to his house where he found Kamajors looting his property. Property worth 3,500,000 leones including a bed, a mattress and his children's property were bundled up by the Kamajors. When TF2-001 objected, the Kamajors threatened to kill him.⁸⁸⁶ TF2-001 was distressed by this situation.⁸⁸⁷

2.5.3.1.4. *Killing of Corporal Freeman*

455. On 15 February 1998, while at Kandeyama Road opposite the police barracks, TF2-001 saw a group of Kamajors rush to Corporal Freeman and drag him to the road. The Kamajors then

⁸⁸⁰ Transcript of 15 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, pp. 55-56.

⁸⁸¹ Transcript of 14 February 2005, TF2-001, pp. 116-117.

⁸⁸² Transcript of 6 December 2004, TF2-056, pp. 68-69; Transcript of 7 December 2004, TF2-056, pp. 95-97.

⁸⁸³ Transcript of 14 February 2005, TF2-001, p. 77. When the Kamajor leaders came to the police station asked for the SSD Boss OC Bundu when they found him, the Kamajor leaders asked OC Bundu to provide them with the guns he had. OC Bundu responded that the guns and ammunition had been distributed among the officers so he had no guns. One of the leaders, Agbamu Murray said they needed the ammunition, OC Bundu refused and he was forcefully taken to his house to search for ammunition: Transcript of 14 February 2005, TF2-001, pp. 76-77.

⁸⁸⁴ Transcript of 14 February 2005, TF2-001, pp. 79-80.

⁸⁸⁵ Transcript of 14 February 2005, TF2-001, p. 80.

⁸⁸⁶ Transcript of 14 February 2005, TF2-001, pp. 77-79.

⁸⁸⁷ Transcript of 14 February 2005, TF2-001, p. 81.

hacked Corporal Freeman to death with a cutlass. Freeman's corpse was dragged along the highway while the Kamajors shouted, "Allahu Akbar, Allahu Akbar". A little girl shouted, "Daddy, Daddy they have killed your brother Freeman."⁸⁸⁸

2.5.3.1.5. *Kamajors Looted TF2-119's Property*

456. On 15 February 1998, a group of Kamajors entered TF2-119's house and threatened him.⁸⁸⁹ They searched his house for ammunition and soldiers. While searching, the Kamajors broke suitcases and took valuables belonging to TF2-119's family.⁸⁹⁰

2.5.3.1.6. *Mutilation/Personal Injury to TF2-119*

457. Later that same day, a second group of Kamajors arrived at TF2-119's house. The Kamajors said Norman had ordered all policemen and soldiers to give their particulars and surrender all of the documents pertaining to their jobs, as well as their uniforms, before they were killed. Norman had assured the Kamajors that they would be approved as military officers, policemen and soldiers with salaries.⁸⁹¹

458. TF2-119 begged for his life but the Kamajors responded that they would execute him and never defy Norman's orders. One Kamajor cut the back of TF2-119's neck while another shouted "Allahu Akbar". TF2-119's ears were partially severed. TF2-119's face and arm were cut with a machete. The Kamajors chopped at TF2-119's back, shoulders, left arm, the back of his head and the bone of the big toe on his right foot. The Kamajors left thinking TF2-119 was dead.⁸⁹²

2.5.3.1.7. *Killing of James Vandy*

459. On 16 February 1998, some Kamajors left the police barracks and headed towards Bo Township with loads on their heads. James Vandy, the Sub-Inspector of the Police Criminal Investigations Division, had been captured by the Kamajors and was made to walk in front of them. During this walk some Kamajors turned and struck James Vandy; he fell, dead. The Kamajors cut James Vandy into pieces while singing "Allahu Akbar, Allahu Akbar." James Vandy

⁸⁸⁸ Transcript of 14 February 2005, TF2-001, pp. 81-85.

⁸⁸⁹ Transcript of 24 November 2004, TF2-119, p. 28.

⁸⁹⁰ Transcript of 23 November 2004, TF2-119, pp. 105-106.

⁸⁹¹ Transcript of 23 November 2004, TF2-119, pp. 108-109.

⁸⁹² Transcript of 23 November 2004, TF2-119, pp. 111-116.

was decapitated by the Kamajors. His head was thrown in a stream under a bridge and the rest of his body was abandoned on the road.⁸⁹³

2.5.3.1.8. *Kamajors Arrest TF2-001 and Loot His Property*

460. After witnessing the death of James Vandy, TF2-001 attempted to flee but was chased by Kamajors because he had been identified as a policeman. The Kamajors were armed with cutlasses and guns but they retreated after hearing heavy gunfire from the direction of Freetown.⁸⁹⁴ TF2-001 followed a large crowd of civilians in the direction of Kenema until they reached Kandeyama⁸⁹⁵ where, under the orders of Kamajor leaders including Agbamu Murray, the Kamajors separated civilians from police. TF2-001 was identified as a policeman and was arrested along with other policemen. The Kamajors searched TF2-001 and took from him 15,000 leones and his watch.⁸⁹⁶

2.5.3.1.9. *Killings at Bo Government Hospital by Kamajors*

461. On 19 February 1998,⁸⁹⁷ while TF2-119 was at Bo Government Hospital, a group of Kamajors came and captured an unidentified man next to TF2-119's bed. The captured man said he had been shot by the juntas when they were pulling out of Bo. The Kamajors carried this man away because they suspected he was a junta.⁸⁹⁸

462. TF2-156 was also a patient at the Bo Government Hospital. He witnessed Kamajors open fire at the hospital because several policemen were patients there. The Kamajors said the policemen were all juntas and should be killed.⁸⁹⁹

2.5.3.2. Looting and Burning

2.5.3.2.1. *Looting and Burning of MB Sesay's House*

463. Upon their arrival in Bo on 15 February 1998, the Kamajors under TF2-017's command went to MB Sesay's hotel on Sewa Road. They looted property belonging to civilians including

⁸⁹³ Transcript of 14 February 2005, TF2-001, pp. 85-87.

⁸⁹⁴ Transcript of 14 February 2005, TF2-001, pp. 87-89.

⁸⁹⁵ Transcript of 14 February 2005, TF2-001, pp. 89-90.

⁸⁹⁶ Transcript of 14 February 2005, TF2-001, pp. 90-93.

⁸⁹⁷ TF2-119 stated that he was saved and brought to Bo Government Hospital by the Red Cross Personnel; he narrates this incident as happening three days later: Transcript of 23 November 2004, TF2-119, pp.118-119.

⁸⁹⁸ Transcript of 23 November 2004, TF2-119, p. 119.

⁸⁹⁹ Transcript of 25 November 2004, TF2-156, pp. 51-52.

womens' dresses, mens' clothes and fans.⁹⁰⁰ The Kamajors then set the hotel on fire.⁹⁰¹ Norman had ordered Albert J Nallo to loot and burn MB Sesay's property because he was considered a junta collaborator for manufacturing Kamajor *ronkos* which the juntas wore to disguise themselves as Kamajors.⁹⁰² This order was given at Base Zero.⁹⁰³

2.5.3.2.2. *Other Burning*

464. Albert J Nallo and other Kamajors burned the houses and properties of junta collaborators that they could not find.⁹⁰⁴ The house of TF2-058 was burnt by Kamajors.⁹⁰⁵ When TF2-056 arrived at the police barracks, he saw four houses that had been burnt by Kamajors.⁹⁰⁶

465. On 15 February 1998, Kamajors under the command of TF2-017 raided and destroyed two pharmacies situated at Tikonko Road and Bojon Street. The Kamajors broke the padlocks and looted all the medicine from these pharmacies. The Kamajors looted these pharmacies because there was a need for medicine at Base Zero; they were implementing a direct order from Norman to loot pharmacies.⁹⁰⁷

2.5.3.2.3. *Other Looting*

466. On 15 February 1998, Kamajors looted TF2-156's property including clothes, shoes, utensils, other household property and his business, which was worth 800,000 leones.⁹⁰⁸

467. Two days after the arrival of Kamajors in Bo, the Kamajors went into people's houses and looted their property. The property of TF2-030 was looted and her landlady's shop was broken

⁹⁰⁰ Transcript of 22 November 2004, TF2-017, pp. 6-7 (CS).

⁹⁰¹ Transcript of 22 November 2004, TF2-017, pp. 6-7 (CS); According to Morries Ngobeh, MB Sesay's property, hotel was looted and burned because it was rumored that he was a junta collaborator who made Kamajor uniforms for other members of the junta: Transcript of 27 September 2006, Morries Ngobeh, pp. 7-10.

⁹⁰² Transcript of 10 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, pp. 72-73.

⁹⁰³ Transcript of 10 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, pp. 71-73.

⁹⁰⁴ Transcript of 10 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, pp. 75-77.

⁹⁰⁵ Transcript of 3 December 2004, TF2-058, p. 87.

⁹⁰⁶ Transcript of 6 December 2004, TF2-056, pp. 68-69.

⁹⁰⁷ Transcript of 22 November 2004, TF2-017, pp. 11-12 (CS).

⁹⁰⁸ Transcript of 25 November 2004, TF2-156, pp. 37-38.

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into by the Kamajors.⁹⁰⁹ When Bobor Tucker arrived in Bo on Monday, 16 February 1998, he saw Kamajors all over Bo Town looting shops.⁹¹⁰

2.5.3.3. Killings and Mistreatment of Civilians

468. When the Kamajors led by TF2-017 were in Bo on 15 February 1998, there was fear among the civilians. Many people had been killed. The situation reports of the Kamajors indicated excessive killing of civilians.⁹¹¹

2.5.3.3.1. *Killing of Collaborators at MB Sesay's Hotel*

469. During the raid on MB Sesay's hotel on 15 February 1998, an unidentified woman who cooked for the rebels was found hiding; she was shot and killed by Kamajors on the order of TF2-017.⁹¹²

470. On the same occasion, Joseph Lappia, the Kamajor deputy commanding officer ordered the killing of John Musa. John Musa was considered a collaborator because he traded with rebels.⁹¹³

2.5.3.3.2. *Killing of TF2-058's Son*

471. TF2-058's son was killed by Kamajors when they entered Bo.⁹¹⁴

2.5.3.3.3. *Mutilation of TF2-006 and Wounding of Five People*

472. When the Kamajors entered Bo they chased, captured and chopped at people with cutlasses. TF2-006 witnessed Kamajors attack five people with knives.⁹¹⁵ There was a lot of gunfire and many civilians fled crying. Some civilians were killed and others suffered amputations.⁹¹⁶ The Kamajors hit TF2-006 with a stick and amputated the fingers on his left hand with a cutlass.⁹¹⁷

⁹⁰⁹ Transcript of 25 November 2004, TF2-030, pp. 4 and 16.

⁹¹⁰ Transcript of 10 February 2005, Bobor Tucker, pp. 56-57; TF2-008 also saw houses burning in Bo Town, and people also made reports that their property had been looted by both the junta and Kamajors: Transcript of 16 November 2004, TF2-008, pp. 105 and 111.

⁹¹¹ Transcript of 22 November 2004, TF2-017, pp. 13-14 (CS).

⁹¹² Transcript of 22 November 2004, TF2-017, pp. 8-9 (CS).

⁹¹³ Transcript of 22 November 2004, TF2-017, p.10 (CS).

⁹¹⁴ Transcript of 3 December 2004, TF2-058, p. 52.

⁹¹⁵ Transcript of 9 February 2005, TF2-006, pp. 8-11.

⁹¹⁶ Transcript of 9 February 2005, TF2-006, pp. 67-69.

⁹¹⁷ Transcript of 9 February 2005, TF2-006, pp. 11-13.

2.5.3.3.4. *Killing of a Limba man by Kamajors after 15 February 1998*

473. After their occupation of Bo, the Kamajors identified one man as a junta collaborator because he was a Limba. The Kamajors sang a ritual song, "Allahu Akbar", and hacked the man to death. After killing him, the Kamajors mutilated his body.⁹¹⁸

2.5.3.3.5. *Killing of a Woman and Mistreatment of Civilians at a Check Point*

474. On 17 February 1998, TF2-001, who left Bo after the attack, reached a Kamajor checkpoint at Fobu village. He saw two men and two women who had been forced to lay naked on the ground on their backs facing the sun. The Kamajors stepped on their stomachs; an unidentified woman's ribs were stepped on and she shouted and then was shot. This woman's guts oozed out between her legs. The woman was taken behind a house and Kamajors came back holding her heart in their hands. The Kamajors threatened to do the same thing to the other people that were lying down. These people were left lying under the sun for hours⁹¹⁹ as the Kamajors opened their anuses to see if they had defecated.⁹²⁰ Joe Nunie, the senior leader of this group of Kamajors, eventually ordered TF2-001's release.⁹²¹

2.5.3.3.6. *Killing of Enemy Combatant John Hota*

475. While in Bo, TF2-017 handed an unarmed captured child soldier wearing civilian clothes to Albert J Nallo. At the time, Nallo was deployed at office of the Red Cross, near the clock tower where captured soldiers were taken and imprisoned.⁹²² John Hota was killed by the Death Squad, which had received direct instructions from Norman to kill John Hota because "he had no place to keep prisoners of war and had no food for them".⁹²³ Hota's head was severed from his body and put in a white plastic bag.⁹²⁴

⁹¹⁸ Transcript of 6 December 2004, TF2-056, pp. 70-72.

⁹¹⁹ Transcript of 14 February 2005, TF2-001, pp. 94-96.

⁹²⁰ Transcript of 14 February 2005, TF2-001, pp. 95-96.

⁹²¹ Transcript of 14 February 2005, TF2-001, pp. 96-97; Transcript of 15 February 2005, TF2-001, p. 38.

⁹²² Transcript of 22 November 2004, TF2-017, pp. 18-20 (CS).

⁹²³ Transcript of 22 November 2004, TF2-017, p.19 (CS); Transcript of 10 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, pp. 84-87.

⁹²⁴ Transcript of 10 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, pp. 84-87.

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476. One week after the capture of Bo, Norman met Nallo in Bo and confirmed that he had sent the Death Squad to kill John Hota.⁹²⁵

2.5.3.3.7. *Torture of TF2-198 and Killing of his Brother*

477. On 16 February 1998, Kamajors searched the house of TF2-198's brother and found TF2-198 and his brother. They were thrown to the ground, beaten and tied up by Kamajors.⁹²⁶ Other people who had come to Bo from Koribondo were also beaten.⁹²⁷

478. The Kamajors took TF2-198 and his brother to Sikissi Y-Junction, where burning plastic was dropped on the TF2-198 for 30 minutes.⁹²⁸ The Kamajors put TF2-198 and his brother in a back room with two corpses dressed in civilian clothes. TF2-198 watched as the Kamajors cut off his brother's head.⁹²⁹

2.5.3.4. Crimes Committed by Kamajors After the Attack on Bo by Juntas on 18 February 1998⁹³⁰

2.5.3.4.1. *Killing of TF2-030's Husband and Six Others on 23 February 1998*

479. On 22 February 1998, while TF2-030 and her husband were at their home near CKC Bo, a group of fifteen Kamajors armed with machetes and sharp irons surrounded TF2-030's husband. Her husband ran to a nearby swamp but the Kamajors followed him and chopped at him all over his body using a machete. TF2-030's husband died at 6am the following morning.⁹³¹ The Kamajors killed TF2-030's husband because he was a Temne; the Kamajors said they would weed all the Temne from Bo Town.⁹³² Six other people were hacked to death by Kamajors at the same time.⁹³³

⁹²⁵ Transcript of 10 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, pp. 87- 89: Albert J Nallo stated that the Death Squad with two Liberians who were Special Forces] entered Bo Town and said to him that they had received an instruction from Chief Norman that he had no place to keep prisoners of war and no food for them, therefore they should kill John Hota. Nallo said the order was from above and he had no alternative. Transcript of 10 March 2005, Albert J Nallo, pp. 86-88

⁹²⁶ Transcript of 15 June 2004, TF2-198, pp. 23-25; this incident occurred when TF2-198 flee from Koribondo to Bo just before Kamajors entered Koribondo and arrived on the third day. See Section V.2.4.4: attack occurred on the on 13 February 1998.

⁹²⁷ Transcript of 15 June 2004, TF2-198, p. 53.

⁹²⁸ Transcript of 15 June 2004, TF2-198, p. 23.

⁹²⁹ Transcript of 15 June 2004, TF2-198, pp. 31-32.

⁹³⁰ On 18 February 1998, the juntas attacked Bo again: Transcript of 22 November 2004, TF2-017, p. 22 (CS); Transcript of 23 November 2004, TF2-119, p. 12J; Transcript of 25 November 2004; TF2-156, pp. 39-41.

⁹³¹ Transcript of 25 November 2004, TF2-030, pp. 6-10.

⁹³² Transcript of 25 November 2004, TF2-030, p. 11.

⁹³³ Transcript of 25 November 2004, TF2-030, pp. 11-12.